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Abstract
While humans may solve problems by applying any one of a number of different prob-
lem solving strategies, computerized problem solving is typically brittle, limited in the
number of available strategies and ways of combining them to solve a problem. In this
thesis, I present a method to flexibly select and combine problem solving strategies by
using a constraint-propagation network, informed by higher-order knowledge about
goals and what is known, to selectively control the activity of underlying problem
solvers. Knowledge within each problem solver as well as the constraint-propagation
network are represented as a network of explicit propositions, each described with
respect to five interrelated axes of concrete and abstract knowledge about each propo-
sition. Knowledge within each axis is supported by a set of dependencies that allow
for both the adjustment of belief based on modifying supports for solutions and the
production of justifications of that belief. I show that this method may be used to
solve a variety of real-world problems and provide meaningful justifications for so-
lutions to these problems, including decision-making based on numerical evaluation
of risk and the evaluation of whether or not a document may be legally sent to a
recipient in accordance with a policy controlling its dissemination.
Thesis Supervisor: Gerald Jay Sussman
Title: Panasonic Professor of Electrical Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What differentiates human intelligence from that of other animals? Although sci-
entists have proposed a number of different theories and differentiators in the past,
including tool use [20], self-recognition [13], and social intelligence [10], each has been
dismissed by later evidence of animals which exhibit behavior like that of humans.
One of the leading theories at present is the human ability to solve problems in a
abstract, “symbolic” manner [29]. Indeed, humans appear to use symbolic problem
solving skills in any number of different ways, including the use of logic in statistical
analysis based on the scientific method, as well as the application of probabilistic ap-
proaches to learning which have formed the foundation of many algorithms considered
to fall under the guise of “artificial intelligence” [25].
While the increased understanding of each of these problem solving mechanisms
has led to a greater understanding and appreciation of the role of symbolic manipu-
lation in human intelligence, less has been done to properly understand and harness
the control of mechanisms that allow humans to make use of any of these approaches
in a flexible manner, outside of work relating to Minsky’s theory of the Society of
Mind [17, 18]. If we are to actually claim we understand the basis of human intel-
ligence, we must also be able to discover the source of flexibility in human thought
which allows us to effectively and efficiently solve problems using any number of prob-
lem solving methods without any preconceived algorithms of how such control may
be implemented.
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1.1 Defining Flexibility
If we are to discuss flexibility of human problem solving skills, we must better define
what exactly is meant by this term. Human problem solving appears to feature a
number of aspects which, while perhaps not entirely unique to humans, are features
which we see as integral to the ability to solve problems. Some of these attributes
include reactivity, goal-oriented behavior, synthesis of disparate attributes (such as
color and location), apparent optimizations for certain kinds of problems, resilience to
contradictory inputs, and the ability to evaluate and select from different strategies
using what appears to be a single mechanism of thought.
While reactive behavior is common to practically all living things (e.g. subcon-
scious reflexes), humans appear uniquely able to react not only to physical constraints
which manifest while solving a problem, but also to theoretical, symbolic constraints,
such as those presented in hypothetical situations and those which occur in abstract
conceptual reasoning (e.g. making reactive decisions about perceived social and finan-
cial situations). Indeed, the ability to combine, apply, and otherwise utilize abstract,
symbolic values and operations is viewed as such a fundamental component of human
thought that its development in the adolescent human psyche is viewed as a transition
between the final two developmental stages in the theory of cognitive development
proposed by Jean Piaget (concrete operational and formal operational) [4].
Such reactivity is particularly evident in humanity’s ability to engage in long-term
planning. Indeed, humans appear to be the only species capable of planning beyond
their lifetime and those of their heirs. When knowledge about specifics will necessarily
change over time, there is a need to adjust any strategies seeking extremely long-term
results to account for large-scale changes in the environment. Human attempts to
address or account for issues such as global warming, technological development, and
large-scale societal change are but some examples of such behavior. Although humans
often encounter practical difficulties in envisioning and planning on extremely long
time-frames, such limitations appear to be cultural in nature (e.g. a drive for short-
term profits), rather than inherent to human intelligence. Indeed, some social groups
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have proven quite willing to solve problems on time-scales beyond many hundreds of
years [1].
Human problem-solving is not only reactive, it is also goal-oriented. On the most
basic level, the desire to solve a problem implies that there is a fundamental goal:
the solution of the problem. But goal-direction may also be observed in the ability of
humans to plan how such problems will be solved, typically by establishing sub-goals
which may be achieved on the way to solving the larger problem. Such management of
sub-goals appears to act at even a sub-conscious, fundamental level in human thought;
a neuroimaging study by Braver and Bongiolatti [2] has implicated the frontopolar
region of the prefrontal cortex of the human brain in managing subgoals associated
with primary goals in working memory tasks.
The ability to synthesize disparate data appears to be another unique feature
of symbolic thought. Research by Herver-Vazquez, et al has shown that humans
are capable of synthesizing information about geometric features and landmarks to
identify locations [9], an ability not observed in rats. Thus, if a problem solving
mechanism is to approach human capabilities, it must be able to synthesize arbitrary
features to derive solutions, lest such a mechanism be unable to solve the deceptively
simple task of locating an object using both geometric and landmark-based cues, such
as locating the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C. based on the fact that it
is “at the opposite end of the Reflecting Pool from the Lincoln Memorial.”
It is often argued that humans are “efficient” thinkers. Although this is rarely
well-supported in practice, as humans easily fall prey to the inefficiencies of classi-
cal NP-hard problems, there are indications that humans are uniquely positioned to
solve certain kinds of problems. Indeed, recent studies making use of functional mag-
netic resonance imaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation have begun to identify
different regions of the brain which appear to be relevant for social and emotional
reasoning [33, 30] as well as “creative” thought such as analogy and metaphor [26, 32].
It is similarly likely that a general-purpose, flexible problem solver must be able to
select from efficient, smaller problem solving components which are specialized at
solving parts of a larger problem.
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Human intelligence is also notable for its ability to handle contradictory beliefs,
contrary to the tenets of classical logic, which necessarily imply that simultaneous
belief in two contradictory statements necessarily renders all statements true (i.e. ex
falso quodlibet). This suggests that human thought may not be founded in the realm
of classical logic. Instead, humans may be capable of thinking within a superset of
such logic.1
The flaws of classical logic with respect to non-contradiction are hardly universal
however, and other logics may yet prove to be the basis of thought. Modern logics,
such as Belnap’s four-valued logic [14], that take into account paraconsistency, in
which contradictions should not cause an “explosion” of conclusions, or logics that
adhere to dialetheism, in which contradictions may exist as facts, seem to embody
much more pragmatic modalities for man’s rational thought. The rational thinker
attempts to resolve observed contradictions by revising his beliefs, not by breaking
down.
Most important, however, is humanity’s ability to apply a wide variety of different
approaches to solving the same problem. For example, the Pythagorean theorem
may be demonstrated by way of any one of dozens of methods, including algebraic
solutions, geometric rearrangement, and even proofs based on dynamic systems (i.e.
physics) [15]. While the symbolic thought of a single human does appear to be
constrained to follow a single approach at any given time (i.e. humans have a difficult
time thinking about multiple unrelated ideas at the same time), not only are humans
free to apply different approaches based on personal judgments made while solving
a problem, but humans may even derive and learn new approaches to solve novel
problems which have yet to be encountered. These approaches may then be applied
in the future. Any system that attempts to achieve a modicum of intelligence must
be prepared to be flexible in its approaches to problem solving in these ways, or it is
unlikely that it will truly resemble the abilities that may be achieved by a human.
1The mere existence of human logicians suffices as demonstrative proof that classical logic may
be evaluated using the human mind.
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Criteria Contribution
Customer eats healthy food2 -2
Customer eating habits are unknown -1
Customer eats unhealthy food +2
Customer is a skydiver +3
Customer being a skydiver is unknown +0.5
Customer is not a skydiver -0.1
Customer is a rock climber +2
Customer being a rock climber is unknown +0.25
Customer is not a rock climber -0.1
Customer is a scuba diver +1
Customer being a scuba diver is unknown +0.1
Customer is not a scuba diver -0.1
Customer rides a motorcycle +2
Customer riding motorcycles is unknown +0.2
Customer does not ride motorcycles -0.1
Table 1.1: Contributions to risk score based on personal behaviors
1.2 A Problem: Issuing Health Insurance
As an example of the flexibility of humans in solving problems, consider the following
scenario:
Sally is an insurance underwriter working for Aintno, a health insurance company.
As the entirety of the reforms of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have
not yet been put into place as of 2013, it is still possible to reject applications for
individual health insurance policies. Sally’s job is to review the files of prospective
customers to determine whether or not they should be issued insurance.
When issuing insurance, Sally must determine Danny’s eligibility in accordance
with Aintno’s eligibility policies, which determine such based on a system which scores
the risk of insuring a prospective customer based on a number of different criteria.
For each criterion that an individual meets, their risk score is adjusted appropriately
(See Table 1.1). Once a final score has been calculated, it is compared with several
thresholds. If the risk score is less than the minimum risk score threshold of 2, Aintno
will issue an insurance policy to the customer. However, if the risk score is greater
than the maximum risk score threshold of 3, Aintno will refuse to issue insurance to
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the customer. If the risk score is between 2 and 3, Aintno will attempt to do more
work to determine whether insurance should be issued.
When Sally arrives at her desk one morning, she finds that she has been given the
file of Danny, a young adult looking for health insurance. As a prospective customer,
Danny’s eligibility must be determined before insurance may be issued. If he is not
eligible, then Sally must note that insurance was denied, and, so as to be able to
defend such denial in legal proceedings, must note the reasons which lead to the
denial (i.e. the facts which led to the excessively high risk score).
Similarly, if he is eligible, she must finalize an offer to insure Danny. In this case,
she must still note the risk score and the sources of the risk, as the sources and amount
of risk are relevant to determine what Danny’s insurance premiums should be.
In order to determine Danny’s risk score, she starts up Aintno’s custom risk anal-
ysis program and begins to input the data from Danny’s file, including his Facebook
and Flickr social network profiles3, which were gleaned from an optional field which
had been filled in in Danny’s file. As she does, Aintno’s risk analysis program mines
the two profiles for useful information which may be used to determine Danny’s risk.
Initially, the program attempts to score Danny’s risk on the basis of criteria other
than his diet, as Aintno’s policy is to avoid making such determinations if at all
possible due to the perceived subjectivity and fluidity of customers’ diets. It identifies
Danny as high-risk, however, due to his engaging in motorcycling and skydiving.
Together with his inability to prove he is not a rock climber and his lack of SCUBA
diving experience, Danny has a total risk score of 5.15.
Sally prepares to issue a denial to Danny, but then remembers that, due to a law
recently passed in Danny’s home state, Aintno is not permitted to mine Facebook for
insurance purposes. She directs the program to remove all facts that depended on
Facebook. This drops his risk score to 2.15 (as the fact that he engages in skydiving
3Although the use of information from social networks has not been used in underwriting as in
this example, some insurers already use information from social networking sites in fraud cases [22],
and a recent study by Deloitte Consulting and British insurer Aviva PLC found that a predictive
model based on consumer-marketing data such as hobbies and TV-viewing habits was judged as
largely successful in comparison with traditional underwriting, finding that “the use of third-party
data was persuasive across the board in all cases” [27].
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eats(subject , food) ∧ unhealthy(food) → eats(subject , unhealthy-food)
likes(subject , thing) ∧ is-a(thing , food) → eats(subject , thing)
likes(subject , place) ∧ is-a(place, restaurant) → eats-at(subject , restaurant)
works-at(subject , place) ∧ is-a(place, restaurant) → eats-at(subject , restaurant)
(eats-at(subject , place) ∧ is-a(place, restaurant)
∧ primarily-serves(place, thing)
∧ is-a(thing , food)) → eats(subject , thing)
Table 1.2: Rules for determining risk
was only found on his Facebook profile), and causes the system to do more work and
activate a set of rules regarding Danny’s eating habits.
As Danny works at Hal’s Hot Dogs (a hot dog restaurant), a number of pre-
programmed rules which assist in assessing and accumulating risk scores based on
eating habits (See Table 1.2) determine that Danny is a likely consumer of hot dogs,
an unhealthy food. As a result, Danny’s risk score is returned to an unacceptably high
4.05. Thus confident in Danny’s ineligibility, she finalizes the rejection of Danny’s
policy.
1.3 A Solution (and Related Work)
Certainly individual components of this problem could be solved using existing rule
systems, data mining tools and a simple score aggregation algorithm. But what would
it take to remove Sally from the equation altogether? Could we automate the process
of determining eligibility and eliminate the role of the human altogether?
A naïve approach to such automation would simply result in a domain-specific so-
lution by determining the requirements and rules surrounding Sally’s workflow. From
a low-level perspective, we may consider the act of receiving a request for analysis to
drive the process of reading and interpreting Danny’s file, which subsequently causes
work to be done to mine and analyze information connected through his Facebook
and Flickr profiles, not only to better inform about lifestyle choices Danny may not
have been asked about in his application, but also to determine whether Danny’s
application may contain missing or incorrect information.
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Evidently, then, automation is possible, but we are left with two subtle issues in
accepting this naïve approach to problem solving:
1. Such a domain-specific solution is likely to be brittle and require careful re-
tooling as rules, regulations, and inputs change. For example, if Flickr increases
the cost (be it computational or financial) of accessing the data it provides,
the heuristics used to guide the analysis are likely to change. Rather than
querying Flickr for every application, Aintno might only wish to query Flickr
for additional details if other parts of Danny’s application suggests that he
might be lying on his application, but proof is lacking. How can we make this
solution flexible depending on changing inputs and rules?
2. While we have a method of producing a domain-specific solution correspond-
ing to a workflow to solve a particular problem, this still doesn’t address the
fundamental act of problem solving in and of itself. It captures nothing of the
flexible planning and thought which we associate with true intelligence, as work
is likely forced into a procedural rather than declarative mode. Is it possible
to generalize this problem-solving approach so that we rely on domain-specific
input knowledge rather than a domain-specific problem solver?
In short, such a domain-specific solution does not capture the true nature of human
intelligence. Much of the flexibility and power of the human mind is left behind during
the process of building the solution according to the constraints of the problem. The
fact that a human may calculate this risk in a number of innovative ways is lost when
an automated solution is constructed, as such automation ultimately implements only
one such method. As a result, naïve, brittle problem-solving mechanisms cannot be
reused and may find difficulty in integrating with other domains.
Instead, I propose a system in which knowledge is expressed in terms of orthogonal
axes of beliefs. These beliefs may be connected in such a way that control may be
made explicit through the expression of appropriate beliefs (e.g. a “need to support”
some belief may drive work to uncover proof which supports that belief). These
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connections also allow these beliefs to propagate through a network of operators
which effect work so as to meet goals expressed as other beliefs.
In some respects, this interlinkage between goals, knowledge, and actions resembles
Marvin Minsky’s K-line theory [16], in which relevant knowledge, stored and orga-
nized hierarchically, may be used to configure perceptive units (P-agents) to create
partial “hallucinations” of perception to assist in achieving goals and solving prob-
lems. By synthesizing “missing” perceptions, Minsky argues that existing problems
are more readily aligned with previously encountered ones, allowing for the selection
of the mechanisms best suited to solving them.
Relevant to the work presented here is Minsky’s extension of the K-line theory
to include an additional “G-net” of goals which influence which knowledge is likely
to be relevant at a given time. Just as knowledge may influence perception through
the activation of K-lines, Minsky proposes that goals may influence the activity and
application of knowledge (and thus, indirectly, perception) through the connections
that exist within the net of goals as well as perceptions.
The problem solving strategy proposed here resembles K-line theory, and treats
goals, knowledge, and perceptions as independent beliefs which may be connected
by a network of computational propagators which propagate beliefs between various
statements of goals, knowledge, and perceptions. In this way, a goal which is estab-
lished to calculate Danny’s risk may establish a belief in another goal which expresses
a “need to know” what Danny’s eating habits are. This system also provides a mech-
anism for connecting these goals, knowledge, and perceptions to systems which do
practical work (e.g. reasoning, discovery mechanisms, or aggregation of values), and
as such moves beyond K-line theory to demonstrate the practicality of such a theory.
It is worth noting that the system presented in this thesis also owes a significant
debt to the work done by de Kleer, et al on the AMORD system [5]. In addition
to making use of truth maintenance systems to maintain dependencies and enable
backtracking in reasoning, the propositional model also allows for the expression of
rules and the assumption and retraction of various premises made possible by TMSs
as a whole, a concept inspired by the work done in AMORD to do likewise.
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Unlike AMORD, however, the “belief propagation” system presents an alternative,
more general view of belief. Where AMORD implicitly assumes that a belief is a
positive “assertion” of truth, this thesis takes the position that a particular “fact”
or proposition may have a number of different beliefs associated with it, including
acceptance of the proposition (i.e. the affirmative belief that the proposition is true),
rejection of the proposition (i.e. the negative belief that the proposition is false), as
well as simple beliefs which express the presence or absence of knowledge regarding
the proposition entirely. As a result, the propositional system proposed here permits
a greater amount of control than AMORD does, due to the greater expressivity of
the propositional system.
1.4 Thesis Overview
This thesis seeks to outline the belief-propagation mechanism proposed above, which
achieves such flexibility in problem solving by modeling knowledge with respect to
support for a given belief. These models are built on top of the propagator net-
work model, described in Chapter 2, and the proposition model of knowledge is then
proposed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 then illustrates how the propositional knowledge
model may be used to solve problems in a flexible manner. Chapter 5 explains how
the belief propagation mechanism may be used to construct meaningful explanations
for the results of such problem solving. Finally, Chapter 6 demonstrates an example
of the propositional knowledge model while Chapter 7 offers some directions for future
work.
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Chapter 2
Propagator Networks
The flexible problem solving mechanism described in this thesis depends on the pow-
erful computational substrate called propagator networks, developed by Alexey Radul
and Gerald Jay Sussman [21]. This computational substrate provides a simple mech-
anism for maintaining and updating partial information structures so that partial
information about an attribute or value may be refined over time. In this chapter, a
short description of the technology is provided in this chapter so that the reader may
better understand the mechanism of the propositional system explained in subsequent
chapters.
2.1 Propagators
Propagator networks consist of a network of two kinds of elements. Propagators are
small computational units which do work on various inputs stored in single-storage
memories known as cells. Any propagator may do work based on data in zero, one, or
more cells, and may store output in one or more output cells. This work may range
from simple operations such as addition and subtraction to complex calculations and
algorithms. In principle, most complex operations are performed by networks of
simple propagators representing basic mathematical operators and “switches” in the
propagator network, which alternately connect one of several input cells to an output
cell.
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Propagators serve much the same purpose as electronic components do in an
electrical circuit; the ways in which simple propagators are connected help to define
the contents of cells at any given point, much as electronic components will influence
the voltage and current at any given point in a circuit.
Propagators also resemble electronic components in another way: just as partial
circuit diagrams may be abstracted and reused as “compound circuits” (such as with
integrated circuits), partial propagator networks may be abstracted and reused as
“compound propagators”. As these compound propagators become active, they con-
struct the partial propagator network represented by the compound propagator, thus
permitting for recursion and the constrution of loops.
For example, a “factorial” propagator might expand into a network consisting of
a subtraction propagator to subtract 1 from the input, another factorial propagator
to calculate the factorial of one minus the input, a switch to determine whether that
factorial should become active (e.g. if the input is less than 1), and a multiplication
propagator which multiplies the output of the “inner” factorial propagator with the
input of the “outer” factorial propagator. Then, if the input is much greater than one,
the inner factorial propagator will be activated to calculate the factorial recursively.
2.2 Cells
The other component of a propagator network, the cell, acts as the glue of the prop-
agator network; it stores data which may be used by propagators to do computation.
The information stored in a cell may be updated at any time by a propagator which
sends an “update message” to that cell. This message contains any new information
which may be used to inform the contents of that cell by merging the contents of that
message with the data currently in the cell using an appropriate merge operation.
The merge operation used to combine the update message and the existing infor-
mation in a cell is selected based on the type of data stored in the cell and the type of
data provided in the update message. For example, if a cell stores a numeric interval
and receives another numeric interval in an update message, it may merge the update
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by taking the intersection of the two intervals. In this way, the information stored in
the cell may be gradually refined by obtaining ever narrower estimated ranges of the
value of the cell.
When a propagator network is constructed, propagators may be registered as
neighbors of cells so that they may be alerted when the cell’s content changes. Once
a cell has finished merging its content with the content in the update message, those
neighboring propagators will be alerted and given an opportunity to do additional
work, typically by making use of the newly updated value of the cell. These alerted
propagators may then send updates to other cells. As a result, updates to the content
of a cell will effectively propagate across the network of propagators and cells.
As the numeric range example demonstrates, the ability to use merge operations
to gradually refine the information stored in cells means that propagator networks
readily lend themselves to the representation and manipulation of partial information.
Rather than representing complete knowledge about a value, the concept of partial
information means that, while the attribute or variable which is represented by the
partial information is fixed, the value of the attribute itself may be incomplete, and
extended as more information is known.
For example, in the numeric range example above, a cell might represent the
outside air temperature, even though the actual value of the cell is a range with lower
and upper bounds. In this sense, the inherent errors in measurement may be made
explicit, so that, rather than some complete, presumably unmeasurable, value, we
give a range that the actual temperature lies within. That is, by providing lower
and upper bounds on the temperature, we are giving partial information about the
temperature, rather than full information.
Cells which store partial information may, with appropriate merge operations,
build up the partial knowledge in a cell when an update is received, so as to ob-
tain a better, more informed, value. In the numerical range example above, range
intersection is an appropriate merge operation, as it may be used to refine multiple,
potentially equally broad, ranges to obtain a more precise answer than any one of the
“input ranges” on their own.
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2.3 An Example
Consider a system which seeks to measure the local air temperature in Boston in
degrees Celsius using two thermometers. Like any practical measurement device,
these thermometers have an error range and are not guaranteed to measure the actual
temperature. These thermometers do not behave identically, so they may report
different temperature ranges. Given this fact, it is possible to obtain a more accurate
measurement of the temperature by considering the intersection of their error ranges.
In addition to their measurement flaw, these thermometers have one other practi-
cal flaw, in that they measure the temperature using different scales. One measures
the temperature in degrees Celsius, while the other measures in degrees Fahrenheit.
As a result, care must be taken to ensure that the measurements of the thermometer
which reads in Fahrenheit are converted to degrees Celsius.
Given this fact, we may consider solving for the temperature of the thermometers
in degrees Celsius using a simple propagator network, given in Figure 2-1-1. Here,
the thermometers act as propagators which update cells with their estimate of the
temperature range. When the Fahrenheit thermometer reports its temperature (as
in Figure 2-1-2), it sends an update to the Fahrenheit temperature cell, cell A. This
cell is then connected to a subtraction propagator, which will subtract 32 from the
contents of cell A and update the value in the output cell (B) with the newly calculated
intermediate value of the conversion (Figure 2-1-3). A second propagator is connected
to that intermediate cell B and will multiply that value by 5
9
, and use that value to
update the Celsius temperature in cell C (Figure 2-1-4).
Note that in all steps in Figure 2-1, the cells to which updates are sent simply
adopt the contents of the update message to be their new content. This is due to the
fact that the cells initially contain a null-like value, “nothing”. This null-like value is
the initial value of a cell, and represents a lack of any partial information about the
cell’s value whatsoever. Thus, since there is no partial information with which the
numeric range in the update data can be merged, the merge operation simply sets
the value of the cell with the initial, “more specific” partial value given in the update.
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merge([55,62],null) =
[55,62]
[55,62]
merge([30.5,34.4],null) =
[30.5,34.4]
[30.5,34.4]
Figure 2-1: A propagator network which combines and converts the outputs of two
thermometers, converting between Fahrenheit and Celsius. A temperature range
from thermometer 1, in degrees Fahrenheit, (2) is sent to a cell. This alerts a chain
of propagators responsible for converting the temperature range to Celsius (3, 4).
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merge([30,33],[30.5,34.4]) =
[30.5,33]
merge([55,59.4],[55,62]) =
[55,59.4]
merge([87,91.4],[87,94]) =
[87,91.4] [87,91.4]
[55,59.4]
Figure 2-2: Propagator networks merge the existing contents of cells with updates
received from propagators. An update in degrees Celsius from thermometer 2 (1) is
merged with existing knowledge of the temperature (2) and propagates to the output
cell containing the temperature in degrees Fahrenheit (3, 4).
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However, when the second thermometer sends its temperature reading in degrees
Celsius as an update to cell C (Figure 2-2-1), the cell actually takes the intersection
of the current value in cell C and the value in the update and uses that value as
the new value of the cell (Figure 2-2-2). Propagators may, of course, be constructed
as reversible operations so that an update of an “output” may refine the “input”. In
Figures 2-2-3 and 2-2-4, the multiplication and subtraction propagators act reversibly
and and divide and add to update the temperature range in degrees Fahrenheit in
cell A. As a result, the Fahrenheit temperature range in cell A is also an intersection
of the two ranges.
2.4 Handling Contradictions
While Figure 2-2 demonstrates the value of refining numerical ranges by taking their
intersection, this raises a conundrum: what if the range in the update does not
intersect the range currently stored in the cell? Or more generally, what if an update
to a cell contains information which contradicts what is already stored in it?
When humans encounter a contradiction in practice, they typically desire to re-
solve the contradiction to obtain a new, reliable value from which additional work
may be derived. Such resolution may be done in many ways, and often results in
additional work being done to determine a resolved value. For example, if a tempera-
ture range contradicts an existing estimate, it may be appropriate to “kick out” older
contributions which may not accurately represent the current value of a changing tem-
perature. It might also be appropriate to determine whether a given thermometer is
broken or unusually inaccurate. If so, this may prompt a user to repair or remove the
faulty thermometer.
Because the ways in which a contradiction may be resolved may vary drastically
depending on the contents of the cell and the nature of a problem to be solved by the
network, implementations of propagator networks should be flexible in handling any
conflicts. The implementation of propagator networks in the MIT/Scheme program-
ming language, which has been used as the basis for the work in the remainder of
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this thesis, normally raises an exception when a contradiction is encountered, causing
computation to halt so that humans may examine the nature of the contradiction
and resolve it in an appropriate manner.
Requiring human intervention is not a practical solution for most problems, how-
ever; it would be untenable to require human input to abort every “dead-end” in a
computation by removing inappropriate inputs, especially in the large search spaces
that lie at the core of many kinds of problems. While the underlying propagator
network mechanism may not directly support contradiction handling, the flexibility
of the “cell merge” operation permits basic contradiction handling to be performed as
part of the logic of such merge operations. The data structure known as a truth main-
tenance system, or TMS, has several features which make it particularly appropriate
for handling contradiction resolution in their merge operation.
2.5 Truth Maintenance Systems and Backtracking
Truth maintenance systems (TMSs) [6, 7] are data structures which allow for the
maintenance of a variable’s value based on the set of minimal supports or premises
for a given value. Although there are several kinds of truth maintenance systems,
assumption-based truth maintenance systems (ATMSs) are among the most useful
to track all possible premise-set/value pairs known to be valid for a given variable.
They may also be “queried” to retrieve the value that is best supported by a given set
of premises. Such values may be returned with the minimal set of premises known
to support the value, conveniently allowing for the identification of the subset of
premises most relevant to the specification of the returned value.
TMSs1 are appropriate contents for cells, as they may be merged by simply taking
the union of the set of value-support pairs in a cell and a set of such pairs in the update
message. The union of the sets of value-support pairs may then be treated and stored
1It is worth noting that not all of the powers I have mentioned in this section are available in
other kinds of truth maintenance systems (such as justification-based truth maintenance systems
or logical-based truth maintenance systems). As a result, whenever I mention truth maintenance
systems (TMSs) hereafter in this thesis, I refer to assumption-based truth maintenance systems.
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as the new contents of the cell, so that smaller support sets for an otherwise identical
value may be propagated through neighboring propagators to their output cells.
By storing values as a function of a set of premises, TMSs may mark these sets as
“no-good” when contradictions are identified during the merge process (i.e. when two
value-support pairs with different values are supported by the set of premises) and
resolved through manipulation of the premise set at merge-time. Such premise-set
manipulation may change the effective value of a cell without actually introducing a
contradiction in the actual value stored in the cell; the contents of the TMS grow and
change independently from the set of believed premises, which are not subject to the
contradiction behavior of the underlying propagator network itself.
Manipulation of the premises during the cell merge operation introduces the abil-
ity to implement algorithms which require a backtracking search. When a particular
premise propagates to a cell and creates a contradiction in a TMS value when the
merge operation is applied, the TMS merge operation may effectively retract that
premise so that other premises may be tested for a suitable solution. In short, search-
ing for the solution to a problem using propagators becomes simply a matter of
searching for the set of premises which solves a problem without causing any contra-
dictions.
But while backtracking is but a necessary technique for problem solving, it is
not the whole story. Propagator networks and truth maintenance systems provide
a powerful mechanism which may be used to solve problems, they are still nothing
more than a computational platform, and they lack any features which might assist
in higher-order problem solving strategies. To actually attack problems and control
problem solving based on needs, desires, or beliefs, we need a way to represent these
needs, desires, and beliefs beyond the simplistic value maintenance of a TMS. For
that, we must turn to the idea of the proposition.
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Chapter 3
Five-Valued Propositions
Controlling problem solving systems requires representations of both those beliefs
that act as input to the problem solvers and those beliefs which may be used to
control the problem solving itself. While the facts about Danny’s hobbies may be
sufficient to determine that he should not be granted insurance coverage, in practice,
it is necessary to be able to express and recognized the need for this determination
before it may happen. I have represented both the these needs and facts used as
input for problem solving in the form of propositions.
3.1 Propositions
A proposition is any statement which may be believed to be true or false. Propositions
differ from traditional logical statements in so far as they have no inherent truth or
falsehood in and of themselves. The existence of a proposition does not imply that the
proposition is true; propositions represent merely the concept of a statement without
any associated belief. To represent the nature of belief in a particular proposition,
each proposition is considered in terms of five different axes of belief: acceptance,
rejection, contradiction, knowledge, and ignorance.
The first two axes, acceptance and rejection, correspond to belief in the truth
and falsehood of the proposition, respectively. That is, a proposition is accepted if
it is believed to be true, while a proposition is rejected if it is believed false. Note
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that truth and falsehood are independent of one another! It is quite possible for a
proposition to be both accepted and rejected (albeit temporarily), or to be neither
accepted nor rejected. By separating these two concepts as two distinct axes of belief
facilitates the expression of complex combinations of the support for and against a
particular proposition which may be evaluated differently in different contexts.
The remaining beliefs may be expressed in reference to acceptance and rejection.
Acceptance and rejection may be considered together to determine whether there is a
contradiction in beliefs. Such a contradiction may force problem solvers to backtrack
by removing certain assumptions that may have led to such contradictory beliefs.
Where the contradictory state of belief is the conjunction of acceptedness and
rejectedness, knowledge (or knownness) is the disjunction of acceptance and rejection.
A proposition is known if there is support for the proposition to be either accepted
or rejected. Similarly, a proposition may be unknown entirely (i.e. the system may
be ignorant of any knowledge regarding the proposition) if there is no support for it
being either accepted or rejected.
This alternate metric of ignorance is what provides for flexibility and control in
problem solving; it is possible to use a lack of knownness to determine when work
should be done to determine a solution. Often, once a proposition is believed to
be true or false, it is unnecessary to expend additional effort to uncover additional
support. For example, in the Aintno example, there is no need to calculate a com-
plete risk score for insurance purposes; once sufficient evidence has been gathered to
determine that insurance should be denied, the work performed to acquire additional
evidence for denial is unnecessary, as the relevant determination (whether the claim
should be accepted or rejected) is already made. (But this does not mean that work
cannot be done later if the evidence changes!)
What is important for all of these facets of knowledge and belief is that each
state of belief is only loosely connected to the others. Excepting the basic logical
relationships (e.g. simultaneous acceptance and rejection is contradictory, and a
proposition cannot be both known and unknown), support for each belief state is
independent and can be used to drive problem solving separately from belief in any
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of the other belief states. As a result, each belief state may drive problem solving in
a different manner appropriate to the problem. If the problem requires it, ignorance
may be used to control when work is done to prove acceptance or rejection, but this is
not a requirement. Similarly, the belief in the rejection of a given proposition may be
used to drive computation to disprove such rejection (e.g. if there is a strong desire
to prove acceptance through contradiction).
3.2 Implementation
The evaluation of a proposition with respect to five values is an important foundation
of expressing belief, but how are we to actually represent this knowledge and its
connections to other beliefs? If we are to properly link propositions so that their beliefs
influence each other and so that computation and problem solving is contingent on the
nature of belief, we may wish to construct a network of propositions using propagator
networks, so that different states of belief in a proposition are able to influence and
modulate beliefs in other propositions. In this way we may cause computation to
occur.
This use of the propagator architecture for “belief propagation” bears many sim-
ilarities to constraint propagation systems, first described by David Waltz [31]. In
particular, the relationships between beliefs which are expressed with respect to state-
ments may be considered edges which constrain the beliefs on either end of the rela-
tionship. For example, a rule A→ B may be represented by a connection between an
affirmative belief in A and an affirmative belief in B, as well as a second connection
between a negative belief in B and a negative belief in A.
While combining constraint propagation and logical programs is admittedly not a
novel idea [12], the propositional architecture exposes program control structures and
integrates them into the system of constraints. Rather than simply delegating and
expressing logical relationships as constraints themselves, this architecture allows for
the amount of work done to “prove” a logical statement to itself be constrained on
the basis of belief in other statements.
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∧∨~ ContradictionUnknown Known
Rejected
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Figure 3-1: A proposition may be described with respect to five values connected in
a propagator network of logical operations. Each circle represents a “cell” containing
the data in support (or opposition) of that particular belief state, and the currently
supported value will propagate its dependencies to related belief states as needed
based on the nature of belief.
For example, it should be possible to condition the “acceptance” of a need to do
research on our “ignorance” of a proposition for which we would like to have knowledge.
That is, if some proposition is unknown, it should translate to an “acceptance” of a
second proposition representing the need to know the first, unknown, proposition.
Likewise, as the first proposition becomes known, the second proposition, the need
to know, should become rejected.
Given all this, when mapping the propositional model to a propagator model, it
is sensible to map the individual “beliefs” to cells. The “rules” which relate beliefs
may be considered propagators which connect belief cells and combine belief states
to generate another.
Given the basic relationships between belief states described previously, we can
model a single proposition as a collection of five cells with logical propagators con-
necting them, as in Figure 3-1. Of special note in this particular model is that the
contradiction cell is automatically populated with a value of false. This captures the
implicit assumption that no proposition may be simultaneously accepted and rejected
(it may, of course, be simultaneously not accepted and not rejected). Furthermore,
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these propagators may be reversible (unlike typical logical circuits which distinguish
logical inputs from logical outputs) so the false contradictory state will not only
support the automated conclusion of accepted = ¬rejected, but it may also assist
in forcing backtracking to occur when there is support for a proposition to be both
accepted and rejected (as will be described later in Section 3.3).
3.3 Hypothetical Beliefs and Backtracking
As mentioned in Section 2.5, we gain additional expressive power if we choose to store
a truth maintenance system as the contents of each belief cell. Though any given belief
cell will evaluate to a given true or false value depending on whether our belief in
the proposition is in accordance with the belief associated with the cell, if a truth
maintenance system is utilized, we may modify our beliefs by simply modifying the
set of premises which we hold to be true. Such a feature also permits backtracking
by removing premises, which I discuss in more detail here by focusing on the concept
of the hypothetical premise.
If we desire to model certain problem solving approaches, we must be able to
adopt premises by supposition, whether because information needed to prove or solve
a problem is incomplete, or because the supposition is itself used in the process of
proving the opposite belief (i.e. proof by contradiction). These hypothetical premises
are similar to other “concrete” premises which might exist in the premise set (those
which might be founded upon observations, measurements, or other external sources
for belief), but hypothetical premises are distinguished by a more transient, context-
specific nature.
Hypothetical premises rarely support more than one independent belief directly.
Additional beliefs may depend on a hypothetical premise in so far as they depend
on the acceptance or rejection of another proposition, but they generally are not
supported directly. In contrast, concrete premises may support multiple beliefs di-
rectly (e.g. Danny’s Facebook interests may serve as a single premise which not only
supports the belief that he is a sky-diver, but also the belief that he is a motorcyclist.)
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More important, however, is that, unlike concrete premises, hypothetical premises
are generally designed to be retracted as additional evidence supports an alternate
position. For example, if we assume that Danny is a non-smoker for the sake of
determining his insurance rates, and we later encounter evidence that, in fact, Danny
actually smokes, it is desirable to reject our previous assumption that he was a non-
smoker and re-determine only those beliefs which were premised on that hypothetical
belief. Thus, we would like to automatically kick out the assumption based on the
fact that the presence of other, more concrete premises create a contradiction.
Another example of the relative transience of the hypothetical can be found in the
argumentation form reductio ad absurdum, which assumes that, if the denial of some
statement is assumed and a contradiction is encountered, said assumption may be
dismissed in favor of a “proof by contradiction” of the contrary. That is, a particular
proposition may be believed to be rejected on the basis of a hypothetical premise
and, should that premise lead to a contradiction, the premise may be kicked out
and acceptance of that same proposition may be supported instead, based on the
support which led to the identified contradiction. For example, Aintno might prove
that Danny is a non-smoker by contradiction as follows:
1. Assume Danny is a smoker.
(Add a hypothetical premise supporting smoker(danny))
2. All smokers have chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).1
(∀x.smoker(x)→ has-copd(x))
3. Therefore, Danny must have COPD.
(has-copd(danny))
4. Individuals with COPD have a FEV1/FVC ratio2 of less than 70%.3.
(∀x.has-copd(x)→ FEV1
FVC
(x) < 70%)
1This is not actually true, but is assumed for simplicity.
2The FEV1/FVC ratio is the ratio of the volume of air expelled in the first second of a forced
breath over the maximum volume of air that can be expelled
3According to standards set by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence [19]
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5. Therefore, Danny must have an FEV1/FVC ratio of less than 70%.
(FEV1
FVC
(danny) < 70%)
6. In fact, Danny has an FEV1/FVC ratio of 92%.
(FEV1
FVC
(danny) = 92%)
7. Such a fact contradicts the prior conclusion about Danny’s FEV1/FVC ratio.
(92% 6< 70%)
8. Due to this contradiction, our initial assumption (that Danny is a smoker) must
be incorrect, and we may instead support the opposite.
(¬smoker(danny))
In the propagator network model, hypothetical premises may be modeled as
premises in the TMS premise set which are specially marked such that they may
be automatically kicked out and removed from the system when a contradiction is
detected. In effect, the merge operation for truth maintenance systems will preferen-
tially remove hypothetical premises if a contradiction is encountered when merging.
New beliefs are then recalculated based on the removed premise.
This principle explains why the contradictory cell is fixed to false: it causes a
truth value for acceptance to be negated for the rejected belief (so that an accepted
proposition is not also rejected, and a rejected proposition is not also accepted).
Then, when support arrives to support the contrary belief, a contradiction will be
encountered in the truth maintenance system of the accepted or rejected cell, forcing
backtracking to occur.
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Chapter 4
Building Problem-Solving Strategies
With propagators as the underlying computational model of propositions, it remains
to be shown how these propositions may be connected to properly solve problems. As
stated in the previous chapter, working with multiple propositions requires the simple
extension of the “belief propagation” model to operate between multiple propositions.
In this chapter, we demonstrate the use of such a model by focusing on a specific
problem, proving the ancestry of a child, using propositions.
4.1 A Simple Rule
Consider the following simple problem: Joe is Mary’s father, and Howie is Mary’s
son. Howie also has a son named Jeff with his wife Jane. Is Joe an ancestor of Jeff?
To a human, this problem is easy to solve given the assumptions that a parent is
an ancestor of their child (i.e. ∀a, b.parent(a, b) → ancestor(a, b)) and that ancestry
is transitive (i.e. ∀a, b, c.ancestor(a, b) ∧ ancestor(b, c) → ancestor(a, c)). In effect,
we may use a simple pair of rules to draw conclusions about an individual’s ancestry
from a collection of parent-child relationships.
If the propositional model of reasoning is general enough to represent all methods
of problem solving so as to integrate them with control, it stands to reason that
it should be possible to model any one mechanism for solving problems, such as the
application of rules, using propositions. The evaluation of a rule has two components:
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1. A proposition matching the pattern of the antecedent of a rule must be identified.
If we consider all propositions to be abstractly represented as n-ary predicates,
then we must be able to discover those specific predicates which match the
pattern of the antecedent of the rule such that any variables in the antecedent
may be filled by atoms in the specific matching propositional predicates.
Given a set of variable bindings which fix the values of variables that may be
present in the antecedent, the set of all proposition-environment pairs must be
found such that the proposition matches the antecedent pattern in arity, and
all concrete atoms and “bound” variables are the same. The environment of a
given pair then consists of the union of the input variable bindings and the new
bindings derived from the alignment of the remaining “unbound” variables in
the antecedent pattern with the values in the matching proposition.
For example, if we take the above rule ∀a, b.parent(a, b) → ancestor(a, b) to
start with, we would need to find some proposition which may be matched with
the pattern parent(a, b), such as parent(howie, jeff), which corresponds to the
new set of variable bindings {a = howie, b = jeff}.
2. We must connect the relevant belief in any matching proposition to belief in
its consequent (as evaluated in the environment created by the matching the
antecedent). In short, we must create an instance of the rule by binding any
variables in the rule to the corresponding terms in the matching proposition.
Since we have matched parent(a, b) with parent(howie, jeff), we have obtained
the relevant bindings a = howie and b = jeff. Thus, we may consider a specific
instance of the parent-ancestor rule parent(howie, jeff)→ ancestor(howie, jeff).
Given the nature of this rule, there is necessarily a connection between the
acceptance of the former proposition of parenthood and acceptance of the latter
proposition of ancestry. As a result, we must connect the two belief cells of the
propositions such that an affirmative (true) belief in accepting the proposition
parent(howie, jeff) will propagate, with its set of premises to the acceptance of
the proposition ancestor(howie, jeff), as depicted in Figure 4-1.
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parent(howie, jeff).
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implies
Figure 4-1: A simple network of propositions which propagates the belief in the
acceptance of parent(howie, jeff) along with its dependencies to the acceptance of
ancestor(howie, jeff). The “implies” propagator ensures that this belief is properly
propagated without modification and merged with the contents of the output cell.
(define (prove-ancestry-by-parenthood a b)
(let ((parent-proposition (proposition `(parent ,a ,b)))
(ancestor-proposition (proposition `(ancestor ,a ,b))))
(accept ancestor-proposition
(list 'prove-ancestry-by-parenthood a b)
(list (accepted parent-proposition)))))
Figure 4-2: Proving ancestry through parenthood. (ancestor a b) is accepted
contingent on (parent a b) being accepted, by way of the “prove-ancestry-by-
parenthood” rule.
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We might represent such a “parenthood” rule using MIT/Scheme code like that of
Figure 4-2. In the function prove-ancestry-by-parenthood, two propositions are
retrieved: parent-proposition (i.e. (parent a b)), and ancestor-proposition
(i.e. (ancestor a b)). With these two propositions in hand, the accept function
states that ancestor-proposition will be believed to be accepted, as informed by
(i.e. caused by) (list ’prove-ancestry-by-parenthood a b). That is, we will
potentially accept (ancestor a b) by way of the fact that we attempted to prove
ancestry through parenthood (with the specified arguments a and b).
This acceptance is not a foregone conclusion, however; the accept function also
states, through its third argument, that this acceptance is based on the acceptance
of parent-proposition. While we may believe (ancestor a b) to be accepted for
any number of reasons, we can only believe it is accepted due to parenthood if we
also believe that we accept (parent a b).
4.2 Knowing the Unknown
While the above example is perfectly acceptable should we know a and b, what if we
do not? As stated above, the rule ∀a, b.parent(a, b)→ ancestor(a, b) does not require
us to know a and b. Indeed, it is true for all a and b. Would it not be better to be
aggressive and proactively find parents, so as to prove ancestry without having to be
told which ones we are looking for?
There are several problems which must be surmounted with such an approach. The
most obvious difficulty is that of finding all such propositions that match (parent
a b). While we can certainly use efficient database storage and indexing algorithms
to find all such (parent a b) that exist when we are given the rule, we must also
be aware that it is very unlikely that we know all parenthood relationships at that
particular point in time. Furthermore, if a system is intelligent enough to know the
generic existence of parents (in short, parent(b, c) → ∃a.parent(a, b)), then a system
may easily get lost simply proving the existence of parents ad infinitum rather than
discovering a relevant ancestry relationship.
44
Even lacking such a general rule, from a pragmatic standpoint it is also quite
possible that we may not know about certain (parent a b) relationships at a given
time, due simply to their current “irrelevance.” In other words, at any given point
there are unknown unknowns ; not only do we not know whether we accept or reject
some arbitrary (parent a b), but there are (parent a b) propositions of which we
are not even remotely aware!
Thus, when making such a pattern matcher, we must take care that it is lazy. Any
attempt to prove ancestry through the existence of a parenthood relationship must
be ready to be acted on at any time, as new parenthood relationships are introduced
and believed to be true. That is, we must be prepared to make the connections
between propositions asynchronously, by making such connections in callbacks which
are invoked whenever such a statement is generated. Thus, we elaborate the code
as in Figure 4-3, which pushes the connection of the “acceptance” belief cells into
the function accept-ancestor-by-parenthood. This function may be called when
a matching proposition is found.
Note that here we replace the instantiation of a proposition (parent a b) with
the find-proposition-matching function. This function searches for propositions
matching the pattern (parent ?a ?b), where the question marks denote named vari-
ables a and b. Upon finding any such proposition, accept-ancestor-by-parenthood
is called, with a first argument containing the matching proposition, and a second
argument containing a mapping of the variable names to the values resulting from
matching the pattern with the proposition.
For example, given the proposition (parent howie jeff), the parent-proposition
variable would contain the proposition itself, while the contents of the environment
variable could be used to determine that the variable ?a would be bound to howie
and the variable ?b would be bound to jeff.
These environmental bindings are used in instantiate-proposition, in which
they are substituted for the ?a and ?b variables in the pattern (ancestor ?a ?b)
to instantiate the proposition (ancestor howie jeff). Then, the acceptance of
(parent howie jeff) is connected to the acceptance of (ancestor howie jeff)
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;; This function is called with a proposition matching the pattern
;; (parent ?a ?b) and an environment that contains the values that
;; matched the pattern variables ?a and ?b. It then accepts the
;; corresponding (ancestor ?a ?b) proposition contingent on acceptance
;; of the parent proposition.
(define (accept-ancestor-by-parenthood
parent-proposition environment)
;; In order to accept the corresponding ancestry proposition
;; (ancestor ?a ?b) we create the proposition by using the
;; environment to fill in ?a and ?b...
(let ((ancestor-proposition
(instantiate-proposition '(ancestor ?a ?b) environment)))
;; We then accept ancestor-proposition based on ?a being the
;; parent of ?b, so long as we accept the proposition
;; (parent ?a ?b)
(accept ancestor-proposition
(list 'prove-ancestry-by-parenthood
(get-binding '?a environment) ; Get value of ?a
(get-binding '?b environment)) ; Get value of ?b
(list (accepted parent-proposition)))))))
;; Find propositions matching (parent ?a ?b) and call
;; accept-ancestor-by-parenthood for each such proposition.
(define (prove-ancestry-by-parenthood)
(find-proposition-matching '(parent ?a ?b) '()
accept-ancestor-by-parenthood))
Figure 4-3: Proving ancestry through parenthood generally. For every (parent ?a
?b) that is known, (ancestor ?a ?b) is accepted contingent on that (parent ?a
?b) being accepted, by way of the “prove-ancestry-by-parenthood” rule. Note the
introduction of the environment variable which contains the variable bindings to a
and b.
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(define (prove-ancestry-by-parenthood)
(find-proposition-matching '(ancestor ?a ?b) '()
(lambda (prop-1 environment)
(find-proposition-matching '(ancestor ?b ?c) environment
(lambda (prop-2 environment)
(let ((ancestor-proposition (instantiate-proposition
'(ancestor ?a ?c)
environment)))
(accept ancestor-proposition
(list 'prove-ancestry-transitively
(get-binding '?a environment)
(get-binding '?b environment)
(get-binding '?c environment))
(list (accepted prop-1)
(accepted prop-2)))))))))
Figure 4-4: Proving ancestry through transitivity. For every (ancestor ?a ?b) and
(ancestor ?b ?c) that is known, (ancestor ?a ?c) is accepted contingent on those
two previous ancestor relationships being accepted, by way of the “prove-ancestry-
transitively” rule. Note how the environment variable is carried as an argument to
the nested find-proposition-matching function, and how it implicitly carries the
bindings of the named variable a through to the inner lambda in which the proposition
(ancestor ?a ?c) is instantiated.
as in Figure 4-2. Similarly, the get-binding function must be used to resolve the
bindings to ?a and ?b. In this way, the explanation of the method used to conclude
acceptance may be constructed.
The observant reader will note that the find-proposition-matching function
takes an empty list as its second argument. A second argument is helpful when mul-
tiple patterns are chained together, as in the ancestor-chaining rule implemented in
Figure 4-4. As the variable ?bmust be the same value in both (ancestor ?a ?b) and
(ancestor ?b ?c) in order to prove ancestry through transitivity, the environmental
bindings created by matching the former must be passed to the latter so as to par-
tially instantiate the pattern (ancestor ?b ?c) with the known value of ?b. Thus,
the second argument acts as an environment in which to evaluate the pattern before
performing a search, and the empty list merely denotes an empty initial environment
containing no variable bindings.
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4.3 Making Work Contingent
So far, we have worked under the assumption that the mere existence of a proposition,
regardless of our belief in it, is justification enough to connect any possible acceptance
of that proposition with the consequent proposition of the rule. This has a distinct
downside; we will necessarily make such a connection for all propositions that match
the specified pattern, even though many of these may never be accepted (e.g. if
they may be rejected in the future rather than accepted). If, for example, our simple
ancestor problem solver is given every potential parent-child relationship in the United
States for a child under the age of 18, this would mean that our problem solver would
need to build nearly 75 million minors × 300 million citizens = 2.25× 1016 ancestor
relationships [11]. This is extremely wasteful, given that only about 150 million
of those relationships would ever be accepted, as a child has exactly two biological
parents!
It would be far more reasonable to make any problem solver’s work contingent,
not on the mere existence of some proposition, but on the nature of our belief in
it in the first place! Rather than blindly matching every proposition (parent ?a
?b), which would result in doing far more work than our original rule, should we
not preferentially connect only those parent propositions which we already accept?
Should we not control our problem solving based on what we believe?
If so, perhaps an appropriate solution would make the body of the function
accept-ancestor-by-parenthood contingent on a particular prior belief. For ex-
ample, only when a matched proposition (parent ?a ?b) is believed to be accepted
should the connection be made between acceptance of the parent statement and the
acceptance of ancestry. In effect, we could make the act of connecting, itself, a propa-
gator which is the neighbor of the accepted state of the parent proposition. Figure 4-5
gives an example of such a compound propagator in action. When coded up properly
in MIT/Scheme using the s:when propagator, which lazily evaluates its body only
when its condition (the first argument) becomes true, such a rule might look like that
of Figure 4-6.
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Cont.U. K.
R.
A.
Cont.U. K.
R.
A.
parent(howie, jeff).
ancestor(howie, jeff).
s:when
Cont.U. K.
R.
A.
Cont.U. K.
R.
A.
parent(howie, jeff).
ancestor(howie, jeff).
s:when
implies
Figure 4-5: Lazily attaching a rule using the s:when propagator, which builds the
connection between the acceptedness of parent(howie, jeff) and ancestor(howie, jeff)
only when the parent relationship is accepted.
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(define (prove-ancestry-transitively)
(find-proposition-matching '(ancestor ?a ?b) '()
(lambda (prop environment)
(s:when (accepted prop-1)
(find-proposition-matching '(ancestor ?b ?c) environment
(lambda (prop-2 environment)
(s:when (accepted prop-2)
(let ((ancestor-proposition (instantiate-proposition
'(ancestor ?a ?c)
environment)))
(accept ancestor-proposition
(list 'prove-ancestry-transitively
(get-binding '?a environment)
(get-binding '?b environment)
(get-binding '?c environment))
(list (accepted prop-1)
(accepted prop-2)))))))))))
Figure 4-6: Lazily proving ancestry through transitivity. Even though propositions
matching (ancestor ?a ?b) and (ancestor ?b ?c) might exist, this function will
wait until both propositions are actually accepted before accepting the consequent
(ancestor ?a ?c), as the s:when function will lazily evaluate its body only when
the contents of the cell in its first argument (i.e. accepted belief state of the given
proposition) is true.
(define (prove-ancestry-transitively)
(rule ((a (accepted (a-prop '(ancestor ?a ?b))))
(b (accepted (a-prop '(ancestor ?b ?c)))))
(accept (the-prop '(ancestor ?a ?c))
(list 'prove-ancestry-transitively a b)
(list a b))))
Figure 4-7: A simple syntax for lazily proving ancestry through transitivity. This
code effectively expands to the code given in Figure 4-6
50
4.4 Simplifying the Code
Because of the complexity of rules like that of Figure 4-6, the remainder of this thesis
will make use of a simplified syntax given in Figure 4-7. This syntax expands into
the syntax of Figure 4-6 through a macro expansion.
The syntax is designed to be easy to understand. In short, the rule keyword
behaves much as the Scheme let keyword, and consists of a list of variable assignments
and a body. The list of variable assignments assigns the various cells of a belief state
(e.g. accepted, unknown) to variables, with the a-prop keyword effectively acting as
a generator which returns propositions matching the specified proposition pattern.
Propositions are matched in order, with the environment for each matching propo-
sition being used to match subsequent proposition (effectively finding each proposition
in order, using subsequent nested find-proposition-matching functions, each tak-
ing, as an argument, the environment returned by the previous proposition). As a
result, all sets of propositions matching the list are discovered.
The body of the rule will only execute conditionally upon the truth of all belief
states in the list of variable assignments, much like the body of the s:when propagator.
Thus, the connection of the acceptance or rejection of a proposition specified in the
body will only occur so long as all of the conditions in the list are true. Furthermore,
as each proposition in the variables is found in order, as soon as one of the proposition
cells is no longer true, work will cease.
The accept inside the body of the rule behaves identically to the function used
above, except that the-prop acts to expand the proposition using the environment
implicitly defined by the enclosing matched variables. That is, the-prop returns
the proposition that would have been defined by instantiate-proposition, given
as the two arguments the same pattern and the environment returned by the final
proposition in the list of variables of the rule. There is also no need to explicitly
obtain the accepted state of the matching propositions as those accepted states are
automatically stored in the named variables. These variables may then be reused in
the body of the rules.
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Thus, in short, the rule keyword effectively defines a rule with the list of belief
states of propositions which must all be believed before executing the body in which
work is done.
It is worth noting that, like in AMORD [5], it is possible to conceive of consequent
rules which are only active so long as the parent rule is active. Since the body of
a rule is simply code which is evaluated upon matching the antecedent of the rule,
by placing a rule within a rule (together with, or in place of, an accept function),
it is possible to make a secondary rule for which the corresponding propagators are
created and connected only when the antecedent beliefs of the parent rule are met.
This conditional construction of rules gives rule-designers additional control over when
rules are instantiated in the first place, providing finer-grain control than a lack of
nested rules would provide.
4.5 Controlling for Unknownness
Despite this improvement, there remains yet another inefficiency. While propositions
will now only be connected if a parent relationship is accepted, such a problem solver
is still useless in certain cases. Proving only 150 million ancestor relations is better
than many times that, but it’s unlikely that we would care to determine every ancestor
relationship. In practice, such an “ancestor finder” would want to focus only on Jeff’s
ancestry rather than every possible ancestor in the United States.
The previous insight regarding the lazy construction of the propagator network
is a crucial one in solving this smaller problem, as we may make use of belief states
other than mere acceptance to help control the process of problem solving. Rather
than creating the relationship between parent and ancestor when we accept a parent
relationship, why not simply extend the lazy rule mechanism to effectively activate
and deactivate its “search for ancestors” based on the goal of proving Jeff’s ancestry?
Figure 4-8 (example code in Figure 4-9) depicts how such a network might operate.
Both a basic desire to know and a lack of knowledge combine to serve as the input to a
s:when propagator, so that the construction of the conditional network in Figure 4-5
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AN
D
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implies
Figure 4-8: Controlling the search for ancestors only when such a search is needed.
Only when (want-to-know (ancestor ?a ?b)) is accepted and the corresponding
(ancestor ?a ?b) proposition is unknown will a proof be attempted (bottom). If
the ancestry proposition is known (i.e. accepted as true or rejected as false) for any
reason, work to prove ancestry will cease.
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(define (prove-ancestry-by-parenthood)
(rule ((k (accepted (a-prop '(want-to-know (ancestor ?a ?b)))))
(u (unknown (a-prop '(ancestor ?a ?b)))))
(rule ((p (accepted (a-prop '(parent ?a ?b)))))
(accept (the-prop '(ancestor ?a ?b))
(list 'prove-ancestry-by-parenthood k u p)
(list p)))))
Figure 4-9: Controlling the search for ancestors only when such a search is needed.
This code corresponds to the behavior in Figure 4-8.
will not even occur unless there is a need to know the ancestry relationship and the
ancestry relationship’s unknown belief state is true. Once it is true (bottom), the
secondary conditional network is created.
A crucial difference between Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-5, however, is that as the
s:when in the former is conditioned on the ignorance of the ancestor relationship, once
the ancestry is known, the s:when is turned off. If the contents of the s:when actually
listen for a number of possible candidate matches and construct the connection for
each one (e.g. in the transitive ancestry case, where there may need to be a number
of different ancestry relationships that must be built), this work may be turned off
when the ancestry relationship in question has been proved. In short, as soon as we
know that there is (or is not) such ancestry, we automatically cease doing additional
work to prove it!
Such a system admittedly bears some superficial similarities to the Belief-Desire-
Intention model of rational agents [23]; beliefs, combined with the desires and inten-
tions expressed by want-to-know propositions, work together to effect work, activate
appropriate rules, and do work. But here, we do not propose that all propositional
systems must adhere to a BDI-like model, but merely demonstrate that the propo-
sitional system allows for the construction of a BDI-like modality of rational actions
and choices. The propositional system is actually far more flexible and may be used
to do more than build simple BDI agents. Indeed, the power of the propositional
system goes farther and may be used to solve far more complex problems that may
even require justifications of the choices made.
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Chapter 5
Building Justifications
While a problem solver capable of answering any kind of complex problem is indeed
more valuable than one which cannot, the answers it produces are only as reliable
as they can be proven to be correct. Mathematical and theoretical approaches may
be used to derive the correctness of a given algorithm, but such approaches cannot
necessarily account for incorrect inputs or assumptions which may produce erroneous
answers. In addition, many practical problems may have a requirement that solutions
be capable of being audited to confirm correctness of inputs and of the accuracy of
outputs for quality control or legal reasons.
Tracing the process by which an answer was constructed has many benefits beyond
auditing, accountability, and improving an end-user’s confidence in generated answers.
Analysis of answer generation may also be used to automate the diagnosis and repair
of unexpected behavior, to help optimize future problem solving performance when
answering similar questions, or even to help model risks involved in solving problems.
Examining justifications for answers may even prove useful in testing hypotheses
by identifying which premises contributed to the generation of contradictions. Such
a feature may have a practical impact. For example, analysis of the orbit of Mercury
using purely Newtonian mechanics predicts the precession of its perihelion, but in
1859, Le Verrier uncovered a conflict between the expected value of this precession
given Newtonian mechanics and the actual value resulting from measurements of
Mercury’s observed position over time. A number of alternate hypotheses to explain
55
the discrepancy were proposed, but each hypothesis had defects when predicting other
astrophysical phenomena which led them to be discarded. Only the replacement of
the premises of Newtonian mechanics with those modified by Einstein’s theory of
general relativity resolved the 43′′ per century discrepancy in Mercury’s precession
while agreeing with other physical phenomena.1 In practice, then, the “traces of the
results” of these alternative theories and hypotheses were analyzed to identify flaws
and propose new theories until a resolution was achieved.
Given all these benefits to the production and use of traces of execution, a problem
solving system which is capable of providing justifications for its answers is more
valuable and more useful than one which cannot. Thus, we must ask if it is possible
to extend the powerful problem solving capabilities of the propositional system to
provide such justifications. If so, the propositional system becomes more valuable for
the reasons mentioned above. The remainder of this chapter focuses on how such a
mechanism may be built with minimal overhead, using the existing structure of the
underlying propagator system to construct such justifications.
5.1 What is a Justification?
Before we can evaluate whether or not the propositional reasoning system can be
modified to support the creation of meaningful justifications for its answers, we must
first define exactly what is meant by the word justification.
A justification is, effectively, a story of how a particular state came to exist, that
is, the sequence of events that, taken as a whole, caused a particular action, product,
or belief to exist. Justifications are typically minimal in extent. For the purposes
of this thesis, a justification does not include incorrect decisions and actions which
were irrelevant to the production of a given state except in so far as they may have
impacted the sequence and timing of the events that are relevant to the state being
justified.
1A comprehensive history of the discovery of, and various solutions to, the problem of Mercury’s
precessing perihelion, up to and including its resolution due to general relativity, is given in [24].
56
In short, a justification is a description of the causal tree of some state, including
both proximal and distal causes, which, if considered as a partially-ordered directed
graph from cause to effect, would be sufficient to explain the evolution and production
of a given state.
Justifications are related to the concept of document provenance, which consists of
“the record of actions taken on [a] particular document over its lifetime,” [8] and data
provenance, a description of how a particular piece of data came to be and arrived in
a given database [3].
Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that we should differentiate justifications from
the concept of dependencies or premises, discussed previously in Section 3.3, which
describe the ultimate supports for something. While the former tells us how we got
somewhere (“why-provenance” in [3]), the latter tells us only those facts or sources
that we depended on to get there (“where-provenance” in the same).
5.2 The Suppes Formalism
So how can we characterize a justification of a particular belief produced by a proposi-
tional problem solver? As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the beliefs held by propositional
problem solvers evolve over time based on the logical connections (such as implica-
tion relationships) between different belief states. What is a natural formalism for
justifications which describe this evolution?
Since we speak of logical relationships, a naïve answer would be to say that our
justifications should take the form of logical proofs. This is not an unreasonable
stance to take, given that all of the examples shown so far involve logical implications,
conjunctions, and disjunctions. But what if more complex propagators are used to
solve a problem? Not all problems are best formulated in terms of a Boolean algebra.
For example, numerical solutions may be more amenable to mathematical algebraic
proofs, and it is quite possible that the relationships between belief states as expressed
by the propagators that connect them may not be purely Boolean or algebraic in
nature. Even so, the generic form of a mathematical proof seems quite reasonable to
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{1} (1) C→ (D→ B) P
{2} (2) −G ∨ C P
{3} (3) D P
{4} (4) G P
{2, 4} (5) C 2, 4 T
{1, 2, 4} (6) D→ B 1, 5 T
{1, 2, 3, 4} (7) B 3, 6 T
{1, 2, 3} (8) G→ B 4, 7 C.P.
Figure 5-1: Example 2 from Chapter 2 of Suppes’s Introduction to Logic, in which
Suppes proves the following (symbolic annotations mine): “If the Cards are third (C),
then if Dodgers are second (D) the Braves will be fourth (B). Either the Giants will
not be first (−G) or the Cards will be third. In fact, the Dodgers will be second.
Therefore, if the Giants are first, then the Braves will be fourth.”
consider, as long as we expand the definition of an operation to include any general-
purpose propagator.
One wrinkle complicates the adoption of a simple proof mechanism. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, navigation of the the answer space (e.g. backtracking) neces-
sarily requires the correct management of the set of dependencies which are trusted
at any given point in time. Indeed, it should be possible not only to trace the “why-
provenance” but also the “where-provenance” for any given belief in our system, so
that the proper derivation of a belief may be well understood and demonstrated.
While traditional proofs, such as those typically taught in basic geometry and
algebra classes point only to the processes by which a derivation or manipulation
of data occurs, the proof formulation proposed and utilized by Patrick Suppes [28]
captures not only the nature of a derivation, but also the dependencies upon which
these conclusions are based. An example of such a proof may be seen in Figure 5-1,
Example 2 from Chapter 2 of Suppes’s Introduction to Logic, which demonstrates the
application of premises (P), tautological implication (T), and conditional proof (C.P.)
to prove the existence of an implication relating to placement in a baseball wild card
race.
In the proof, Suppes tracks not only the premises upon which each subsequent
statement depends (left column), but also the reasons for derivation (right column).
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As such, Suppes’s proof formalism demonstrates that it is possible not only to show
(8) G → B, but also that it is directly derived from (4) G and (7) B by conditional
proof, and depends on the continued acceptance of the premises (1) C → (D → B),
(2) −G ∨ C, and (3) D.
Suppes’s example also demonstrates the difference between dependencies and jus-
tifications. Although the premise (4) G is an integral part of the proof of (8), the
conclusion does not actually depend on it being true because implications may be
derived using conditional proofs without dependence on the antecedent.
5.3 Building Justifications
Given the power of Suppes’s formalism in managing both justifications and depen-
dencies jointly, can we integrate Suppes’s formalism into the propositional reasoning
system in such a way that we may gain the power of justification generation seam-
lessly without any additional syntactic changes to our propositional reasoning? I will
demonstrate that this is indeed possible, by making use of the innate graph structure
of the propagator network.
Since a propagator network may be envisioned as a graph of cells and propagators,
it is possible to impose a data structure above and beyond those used in the basic
propagator “publish-subscribe” model to represent the abstract structure of propaga-
tors as a navigable directed graph. The MIT/Scheme implementation of propagators
includes such an abstraction by collecting cells into groups called diagrams.
Diagrams may be defined recursively, as diagrams may contain one or more parts
which are also diagrams, with cells acting as simple diagrams consisting of no addi-
tional parts. More complex diagrams may be made from combining cells and diagrams
which contain them as component parts of the complex diagram.
As a result, the diagram structure of a propagator network is effectively a pyrami-
dal, directed graph (as in Figure 5-2) which effectively maps cells on the computational
level to the “components” to which they belong at decreasing levels of abstraction. A
given diagram (or cell) may belong to any number of parent “clubs” (i.e. the parent
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diagrams of which the diagram is a part). As a result, the given pyramid of diagrams
is not a tree structure but a directed, acyclic graph. When a propagator is created, a
diagram is automatically constructed at the first abstraction layer above basic cells.
This diagram collects those cells which it reads and writes as “parts” of the initial
abstract diagram.
As multiple propagators may claim a cell as a “part” of the parent diagram, cer-
tain lower-level diagrams may be easily identified as “boundaries” between different
diagrams at a higher abstraction level. For example, cell C in Figure 5-2 belongs not
only to temperature-converter, but also weather-model, and as such may be seen
as a cell which is on the boundary of the two diagrams.
By annotating the part relationships at the time the network is created, it is pos-
sible to determine whether cell C is an input to A, an input to B, or both, as the
propagators themselves may be analyzed to determine whether or not their imple-
mentation will read a cell or write a cell (or both). As such, promises to “only read
a cell” may be interpreted as cells which are input to the diagram, while promises to
“write only” would similarly be interpreted as output.
Justifications for the content of a cell may thus be constructed by climbing the
“diagram pyramid” to an appropriate abstraction level, identifying “input” cells of the
given diagram, and then querying those cells for their contents and working to find
their inputs in turn. In this manner, a list of antecedent cells and values may be
crawled at a given abstraction level using an appropriate graph-traversal algorithm,
and the values of those cells may be collected, along with the dependencies and any
other information stored in the TMS in each cell.
For example, given the first part of the example in Figure 5-2, suppose that we
wish to generate a justification for the value at cell C. If we asked for a justification
(Figure 5-3), we would determine which diagrams C was an output for at a given
level (say level 2). For these diagrams (x× 5/9), we would then determine the inputs
(B) and include those in the justification. Likewise, we would then identify those
diagrams for which B is an output at the same diagram level, 2 (x − 32), and the
inputs to those diagrams (A). The full justification would thus include the value and
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Figure 5-2: A complex propagator network maps to a pyramidal semantic structure.
More abstract operations are represented at higher levels. At the top, three cells,
A, C, and D, are connected by two compound propagators, temperature-converter
and weather-model. Both compound propagators expand into partial propagator
networks. Below, the same network is laid out in terms of its diagrammatic structure.
Level 3 represents the concrete cells of the network, while higher levels represent the
propagators and compound propagators that connect them. All arrows represent
“part-of” relationships between the cells or diagrams at one level and the diagrams
that belong to a higher level. Colors and line patterns represent annotations which
may be made (e.g. a promise that a given cell is used only as input or as output by
a propagator).
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supports of each cell crawled in this process, A, B and C, by querying the truth
maintenance system stored in each cell. These TMSs are necessarily informed by the
propagators that sent updates to them.
While the example in Figure 5-3 describes a system in which each propagator
has only one input, the recursive algorithm for generating justifications is equally
applicable to diagrams with an arbitrary number of inputs. Instead of examining
each input sequentially, the inputs could be crawled and included in the justification
in a breadth-first manner.
5.4 Simplifying Justifications
One significant issue encountered when constructing a justification is the choice of an
appropriate abstraction level for the justification. For example, when converting a
temperature between degrees Fahrenheit and degrees Celsius, as in Chapter 3, it may
be useful to detail each step in the conversion to demonstrate that the conversion is
working correctly. On the other hand, if the conversion is part of a much more complex
system, such as a numerical weather model, the precise trace of each mathematical
step to convert contributes to excessive verbosity of the justification. It may suffice to
state that the temperature was converted, leaving the exact mathematical operations
implicit.
Given this, it would be incredibly useful if we did not necessarily commit to a
level of detail until the time the justification was generated. That is, our choice of
mechanism for producing justifications should allow us to obtain multiple levels of
detail of a justification.
Fortunately, this struggle between the simple and the complex is easily resolved in
the diagram model. The pyramidal structure of the diagram-part relationship allows
for the creation of any number of abstraction layers between the lowest “computa-
tional” units and the highest level which represents the problem solver itself. As a
result, it is possible to choose to display a given level of justification (simple to com-
plex) by simply selecting an appropriate abstraction level to generate justifications.
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41°F 9 5°C
x - 32 x × 5/9
temperature-converter
[propagator network]
A B C
(1)(2)(3)
((C has-value 5 ; (1)
by (* B (/ 5 9))
with-premises thermometer)
(B has-value 9 ; (2)
by (- A 32)
with-premises thermometer)
(A has-value 41 ; (3)
by (thermometer-reading)
with-premises thermometer))
Figure 5-3: A justification may be generated by recursively crawling diagrams at a
given level from outputs to inputs.
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41°F 9 5°C
x - 32 x × 5/9
temperature-converter
[propagator network]
A B C
(1)(2)
((C has-value 5 ; (1)
by (temperature-converter A)
with-premises thermometer)
(A has-value 41 ; (2)
by (thermometer-reading)
with-premises thermometer))
Figure 5-4: A simpler justification may be generated by crawling diagrams at higher
levels.
A simple justification may be generated by simply climbing to one of the highest
abstraction levels. For example, instead of generating a detailed justification from
level 2 as in Figure 5-3, we may instead generate a simpler justification by crawling
the diagrams at level 1, as shown in Figure 5-4.
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Chapter 6
Propositions in Practice
So far, I have demonstrated the principles of the propositional reasoning system, but
I have yet to demonstrate its viability in solving real world problems such as the
insurance company scenario presented at the beginning of this thesis. In this chapter,
I intend to walk through the implementation of a propositional problem solver capable
of addressing that very problem. In so doing, I hope that the principles which I have
laid out in previous chapters will be made obvious.
6.1 The Problem
As stated previously, consider an insurance underwriter, Sally, who works for the
insurance company Aintno. As she reviews the file of a prospective customer, Danny,
she must make a decision on his eligibility for insurance based on his risk and activity.
As part of his application, he has included information about his Facebook and Flickr
social networking accounts, among the many other details in his application.
Sally feeds this application to an assisting proposition-based problem solver which
must then decide whether or not Danny is eligible for insurance based on a set of
scoring criteria (Table 6.1). If Danny’s aggregate score is less than 2, Danny is
eligible for insurance. If it is greater than 3, Danny is ineligible for insurance. If it
is between 2 and 3, more work may be done to prove Danny’s eligibility (including a
determination of Danny’s eating habits).
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Criteria Contribution
Customer eats healthy food -2
Customer eating habits are unknown -1
Customer eats unhealthy food +2
Customer is a skydiver +3
Customer being a skydiver is unknown +0.5
Customer is not a skydiver -0.1
Customer is a rock climber +2
Customer being a rock climber is unknown +0.25
Customer is not a rock climber -0.1
Customer is a scuba diver +1
Customer being a scuba diver is unknown +0.1
Customer is not a scuba diver -0.1
Customer rides a motorcycle +2
Customer riding motorcycles is unknown +0.2
Customer does not ride motorcycles -0.1
Table 6.1: Contributions to risk score based on personal behaviors
This problem solver has the ability to crawl the social network information Danny
has provided and use the conclusions drawn from that information (posts, photos,
etc.) to justify arguments in favor of a given risk score. Indeed, such justifications
are a necessary part of the problem solver; once a score has been generated, Sally
must include a justification for the score when she submits her final decision with
respect to granting or denying eligibility to Danny.
6.2 Bootstrapping the System: Propositions
For the purposes of this example, I will assume that the problem of extracting beliefs
from images and free-form text is solved and that such algorithms are capable of pop-
ulating belief states of appropriate propositions which are indexed in a database. This
is a reasonable assumption to make; algorithms for entity and sentiment extraction
from text, and object and gesture recognition in images have already been deployed
in active production systems. Additionally, the methods used to solve these problems
are not directly relevant to the problem of actually calculating a risk score addressed
in this example.
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Proposition Current Belief Evidence
Danny engages in skydiving accepted Facebook post
Danny engages in motorcycling accepted Flickr photo
Danny engages in SCUBA diving rejected Danny’s forms
Danny engages in rock-climbing unknown Danny’s forms
Hal’s Hot Dogs is a restaurant accepted Hal’s Hot Dogs website
Hal’s Hot Dogs primarily sells hot dogs accepted Hal’s Hot Dogs website
Hot dogs are food accepted common knowledge
Hot dogs are unhealthy accepted FDA
Danny works at Hal’s Hot Dogs accepted Danny’s forms
Danny likes Hal’s Hot Dogs accepted Danny’s forms
Table 6.2: Propositions which might be believed about Danny
Thus, the propositions that might be discovered by such a system may be sim-
ply expressed by populating the belief state of such propositions which have been
discovered. Some of these propositions are given in Table 6.2.
As stated in Chapter 3, we may express propositions by virtue of creating ap-
propriate propagator networks for each proposition. The cells created as part of
the network may then be populated with an appropriate value associated with each
belief state based on the dependencies (i.e. the posts, photos, etc.) from which
the belief was established. In my MIT/Scheme problem solver, a proposition may
be constructed using the proposition function, which is passed the pattern of the
proposition to be asserted as its argument (for example, (proposition '(Danny
engages-in skydiving))).
But how do we populate our initial beliefs? To accomplish this, we “tell” a par-
ticular belief state its value. The tell! function automatically constructs an up-
date message which is sent to the cell specified as the first argument of the func-
tion. The value to be stored is given as the second argument, and all all subse-
quent arguments are the dependencies for that value. Thus, we might state that the
proposition (Danny engages-in skydiving) is accepted by way of a Facebook post
through the function call (tell! (accepted (proposition '(Danny engages-in
skydiving))) #t 'Facebook). In this way, we update the accepted belief cell with
the true value (#t) and a dependency named Facebook.
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(define (true! pattern source)
(tell! (accepted (proposition pattern)) #t source))
(define (unknown! pattern source)
(tell! (unknown (proposition pattern)) #t source))
(define (false! pattern source)
(tell! (rejected (proposition pattern)) #t source))
Figure 6-1: The tell! function can be simplified to refer to only the true, false
and unknown cells.
In practice, we may simplify telling true, false, and unknown values by making
appropriate functions which expand to the verbose tell! syntax for these common
cases, as in Figure 6-1. With these functions in hand, it becomes relatively sim-
ple to express basic beliefs, given in Figure 6-2. Thanks to the dependence on the
proposition function, the true!, unknown! and false! functions automatically
create the propagator network for each proposition if it does not already exist. Oth-
erwise, the proposition is retrieved from a database.
6.3 Bootstrapping the System: Rules
Establishing the basic belief states is only half of the solution, however. The core
of any problem solver are the rules and algorithms which allow it to actually draw
conclusions, and I have not yet demonstrated how such rules might be created. To
do so, we turn to Chapter 4, which demonstrated the construction of a number of
problem solving rule components.
The scoring rules in Table 6.1 may be readily expressed in terms of simple rules,
using the rule syntax introduced at the end of the chapter, as each appropriate belief
state would be matched to establish the contribution to risk. Some of these rules can
be seen in Figure 6-3, where a simple pattern match against an appropriate belief
state is sufficient to accept a “contribution to risk” of an appropriate size.
For example, in the case of the risk if a customer is a sky-diver, the proposi-
tion (contribution risk ?subject 3.0 skydiver) is accepted for a given subject
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;;; Ground facts about Danny
(true! '(Danny engages-in skydiving) 'Facebook)
(true! '(Danny engages-in motorcycling) 'Flickr)
(false! '(Danny engages-in scubadiving) 'Danny)
(unknown! '(Danny engages-in rockclimbing) 'Danny)
;;; His eating habits
(true! '(hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant) 'Hal)
(true! '(hals-hotdogs primarily-serves hotdogs) 'Hal)
(true! '(hotdogs is-a food) 'common-knowledge)
(true! '(hotdogs is unhealthy) 'FDA)
(true! '(Danny works-at hals-hotdogs) 'Danny)
(true! '(Danny likes hals-hotdogs) 'Danny)
;;; Ground facts about AINTNO
(true! '(risk-accept-threshold AINTNO 2) 'aintno-1)
(true! '(risk-reject-threshold AINTNO 3) 'aintno-2)
Figure 6-2: Beliefs captured by the risk-scoring system based on information gleaned
from Danny’s Facebook and Flickr accounts, as well as his insurance application (the
last labeled with a dependency of 'Danny). In addition, two risk score thresholds are
included as belief states.
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(rule ((s (accepted (a-prop '(?subject engages-in skydiving)))))
(accept (the-prop '(contribution risk ?subject 3.0 skydiver))
(list 'risk-estimate 'skydiving)
(list s)))
(rule ((s (unknown (a-prop '(?subject engages-in skydiving)))))
(accept (the-prop '(contribution risk ?subject 0.5 skydiver))
(list 'risk-estimate 'skydiving)
(list s)))
(rule ((s (rejected (a-prop '(?subject engages-in skydiving)))))
(accept (the-prop '(contribution risk ?subject -0.1 skydiver))
(list 'risk-estimate 'skydiving)
(list s)))
Figure 6-3: Rules establishing contributions to risk with respect to whether an indi-
vidual is a sky-diver
only when the proposition (?subject engages-in skydiving) is accepted. Such
a contribution is accepted contingent on the acceptance of the engages-in state-
ment, but its acceptance also labeled with the why-provenance from its second argu-
ment. Thus, the acceptance of the risk contribution is due to (list 'risk-estimate
'skydiving), that is, based on a risk-estimate with respect to skydiving.
Rules can, of course, be more complex than these simple sky-diving rules. Aintno’s
policy may state, for example, that the fact of whether or not Danny eats unhealthy
food is only relevant if there is a need to determine it (i.e. if there is sufficient
evidence to reject Danny on another basis, there is no reason to investigate Danny’s
eating habits). In such a case, we can turn to the more complex want-to-know
formula expressed at the end of Chapter 4. Such an expression might resemble that
in Figure 6-4.
But a rule such as that in Figure 6-4 demands a way to establish the need to
determine whether Danny eats unhealthy food. For that, we might wish to condition
the specific “need to know” on a more general belief that “information is lacking”.
Such a condition would necessarily connect the general directive to find information
to score Danny’s risk with the specific ways in which the information may be found
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(rule ((req (accepted (a-prop '(does ?subject eat unhealthy-food)))))
(rule ((e (accepted (a-prop '(?subject eats ?food))))
(f (accepted (a-prop '(?food is unhealthy)))))
(accept (the-prop '(?subject eats unhealthy-food))
(list 'common-sense 'food)
(list e f)))
(rule ((l (accepted (a-prop '(?subject likes ?thing))))
(t (accepted (a-prop '(?thing is-a food)))))
(accept (the-prop '(?subject eats ?thing))
(list 'preference 'food)
(list t l)))
(rule ((p (accepted (a-prop '(?subject likes ?place))))
(r (accepted (a-prop '(?place is-a restaurant)))))
(accept (the-prop '(?subject eats-at ?place))
(list 'likes 'restaurant)
(list p r)))
(rule ((p (accepted (a-prop '(?subject works-at ?place))))
(r (accepted (a-prop '(?place is-a restaurant)))))
(accept (the-prop '(?subject eats-at ?place))
(list 'works-at 'restaurant)
(list p r)))
(rule ((p (accepted (a-prop '(?subject eats-at ?place))))
(r (accepted (a-prop '(?place is-a restaurant))))
(s (accepted (a-prop '(?place primarily-serves ?thing))))
(f (accepted (a-prop '(?thing is-a food)))))
(accept (the-prop '(?subject eats ?thing))
(list 'eating-at 'restaurant)
(list p r s f)))
)
Figure 6-4: Rules that help determine whether or not Danny eats unhealthy food.
Such rules might only ever be active (i.e. work might only ever be done to prove that
he eats unhealthy food) if there is not sufficient proof to render Danny ineligible for
insurance.
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(rule ((i
(accepted
(a-prop '(?company needs-more-information ?subject)))))
;; Eating unhealthy food is questionable, but not worth looking at
;; unless not enough other information to determine eligibility.
(accept (the-prop '(does ?subject eat unhealthy-food))
(list 'digging-deeper)
(list i))
(rule ((e (accepted (a-prop '(?subject eats unhealthy-food)))))
(accept (the-prop
'(contribution risk ?subject +2 eats-unhealthy-food))
(list 'risk-estimate 'unhealthy-food)
(list e)))
(rule ((e (unknown (a-prop '(?subject eats unhealthy-food)))))
(accept (the-prop
'(contribution risk ?subject -1 unknown-food-habits))
(list 'risk-estimate 'unhealthy-food)
(list e)))
(rule ((e (rejected (a-prop '(?subject eats unhealthy-food)))))
(accept (the-prop
'(contribution risk ?subject -2 eats healthy-food))
(list 'risk-estimate 'unhealthy-food)
(list e))))
Figure 6-5: There only exists a need to score the risk from eating unhealthy food if
there is not enough evidence to accept or reject an individual’s insurance on other
grounds. Thus, as long as there is a need for more information, the need to determine
whether an individual eats unhealthy food (and appropriate risk scoring) will be
established.
(e.g. asking whether Danny eats unhealthy food). Thus, we may include a rule
like that in Figure 6-5, which conditions not only the scoring of unhealthy eating
habits, but also the establishment of the “need to know,” on a general need for more
information.
The expression of such a connection may seem at first glance to be needless
pedantry which may lead to an infinite regress of determining whether we “need
to know that we need to know”. Though an implementer will necessarily need to
tread with care to determine what is reasonable intent, this first step is actually quite
reasonable. As mentioned before, if the cost of discovering whether or not Danny
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eats unhealthy food is expensive (it may take considerable processing and time to
interpret and extract features and intents from Facebook posts), we likely will only
want to do the work to determine whether or not Danny eats unhealthy food if we
cannot prove with certainty that Danny is, or is not, eligible for insurance. Thus, the
connection between the general “lack of information” and the specific “need to know”
Danny’s eating habits is actually quite indicative of a need for the level of inherent
control which propositional reasoning offers.
With all these rules in place, there remains only one component necessary to
actually properly rate risk: the mechanism to accumulate risk scores itself. Though
I have thus far demonstrated that problems may be resolved by the rule mechanism
described in Chapter 4, such partial propagator networks are not the only networks
which may be useful in solving problems. The propagator network model permits
a vast number of network constructions which may be used to solve problems in a
wide variety of ways. Accumulation may be accomplished by one such “alternative”
network structure.
Unlike the basic scoring mechanisms described above, accumulation is a complex
operation which cannot be simply implemented with rules alone, due to the need to
“undo” an accumulation when premises change. For example, while an assumption
of ignorance regarding Danny’s sky-diving hobby (or lack thereof) contributes a risk
factor of 0.5 to overall accumulated risk, if, at a later time, he is found to indeed
engage in sky-diving, the contribution to the overall accumulated risk score must be
changed from 0.5 to 3. This change will necessarily alter the overall risk score (such
as by increasing it from 3.5 to 5). Furthermore, the overall risk score must then
depend on the sources of information which contribute to the acceptance of Danny’s
sky-diving which were not previously present, as the new score of 5 is only true, in
part, due to that information.
In order to implement accumulation, an alternative partial network may be con-
structed like that presented in Figure 6-6. The basic premise of the accumulator
structure is that, at any stage in the life of an accumulator, there is an implicit as-
sumption that all contributions to the value of the accumulator are known. Thus, the
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3.5 6.25p:+0 p:+
identity-value
(A)
partial-value-1
(B)
partial-value-2
(D)
output-value
3.5
input-1
aggregation-
propagator
(C)
aggregation-
propagator
(C)
p:default-
value
p:default-
value
2.75
input-2
2.753.5 input-buffer-1 input-buffer-2
6.25#f
there-is-only-one-input
(E)
p:switch p:switch #t
there-are-only-two-inputs
(E)
Figure 6-6: A propagator network which accumulates two values by addition (p:+).
Partial values slowly accumulate until a p:switch connects a partial value (partial-
value-2) to the final value based on the assumption that there are no more inputs to
the accumulator.
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basic network of an accumulator constructs a “final” partial accumulated value (D)
by chaining partially accumulated values (B) starting with an identity value (A) to
additional inputs to the accumulator by way of a known binary operator (such as the
p:+ addition operator) (C). This “final” partial accumulated value is then connected
to an output cell through a “switch” propagator which only propagates the “final”
value to the output as long as the assumption that there are no more contributions
to the accumulator is true (E).
Figure 6-7 illustrates how the number of inputs to an accumulator may increase.
When a new contribution is identified, the chain of accumulator inputs may be ex-
tended by constructing additional propagators and cells and appending them to the
chain of partial accumulations. Following this, the assumption that all contributions
were known may be kicked out, disconnecting the old “final” partial accumulation
(D) from the output cell. Then, the newly constructed “final” partial accumulation
(F) may be attached to the output cell to effectively update the value with the new
contribution.
Figure 6-8 illustrates how removing contributions may be accomplished through
the use of the p:default-value propagator and the buffer cell which sit between
the contributing cell and the partially accumulated value. The p:default-value
propagator provides a default value for an output cell whenever the primary input (i.e.
the contributing cell) contains no contribution whatsoever. Thus, when a contribution
is “removed”, one need only remove the support for the value in the input cell. With no
supported value in its primary input, the p:default-value propagator will instead
connect the alternate input (i.e. the identity cell) to the input buffer cell used as input
to the partial accumulation. As a result, only the identity value supports the partial
accumulation at that point, so that the actual contribution at the newly unsupported
partially accumulated value is effectively eliminated thanks to the use of the identity
value for the operation, such as adding 0 or multiplying by 1.
We may, of course, simplify this partial network using a compound propagator,
named p:accumulator. This propagator constructs an accumulation network and
is invoked with five arguments. The first argument is a simple symbolic prefix used
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3.5 3.5p:+0 p:+
identity-value
(A)
partial-value-1
(B)
partial-value-2
(D)
output-value
3.5
input-1
aggregation-
propagator
(C)
aggregation-
propagator
(C)
p:default-
value
p:default-
value
null
input-2
03.5 input-buffer-1 input-buffer-2
3.5#f
there-is-only-one-input
(E)
p:switch p:switch #t
there-are-only-two-inputs
(E)
Figure 6-8: Removing a contribution from an input to the propagator-based accu-
mulator in Figure 6-6. Here, input-2 is removed (its value becomes *the-nothing*,
depicted here as null). This causes the p:default-value propagator to which it is
connected to instead propagate the value from the identity cell (0) to the input of the
partial-accumulation.
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for labeling and debugging. The second is the name of the binary operator used
in accumulation (for example, p:+ or p:*) and the third argument is the identity
value for that operation. The fourth argument is the cell to which the output of
the accumulator will be connected, and the fifth and final argument is a cell which
will contain the propagator which may be invoked to add new contributions to the
accumulator.
With this propagator in hand, the accumulation of risk may be handled using the
code in Figure 6-9, which constructs an accumulator whenever a request for accumu-
lation (please-accumulate ?type ?subject ?requester) is found and accepted.
Then, for every proposition representing an accumulator contribution (contribution
?type ?subject ?num ?reason) which is accepted, a cell representing the value of
that contribution is created, and its value is supported by the acceptance of the
contribution proposition. This value is then connected to the accumulator using the
p:add-new! propagator, at which point its contribution will be reflected in the output
cell of the accumulator.
Finally, the output value of the accumulator is mapped to a proposition of the
form (accumulator ?type ?subject ?requester ,accumulation), allowing other
propositional pattern-matching to make use of the value of the accumulation.
With such a mechanism, Aintno need only express a need to accumulate risk,
which may be done using rules and tests for risk thresholds, as in Figure 6-10,
in which the need to determine insurability establishes a need for accumulation
(please-accumulate risk ?subject ?company), and checks whether a given accu-
mulated risk (accumulator risk ?subject ?company ?risk-accumulator) is be-
low the acceptance threshold or above the rejection threshold before accepting or
rejecting on that basis.
6.4 The System in Operation
With the rules and propositions about Danny in place, we need only establish a need
to determine Danny’s insurability as an accepted proposition by way of the assertion
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(rule ((r
(accepted
(a-prop '(please-accumulate ?type ?subject ?requester)))))
(let* ((name (symbol (pattern-value ?type)
":accumulator-of:"
(pattern-value ?subject)
":for:"
(pattern-value ?requester)))
(contribution-counter (make-counter)))
(let-cells (accumulation p:add-new!)
(p:accumulator name p:+ 0 accumulation p:add-new!)
(rule ((c
(accepted
(a-prop '(contribution ?type ?subject ?num ?reason)))))
(let* ((cname
(symbol name ":contribution:" (contribution-counter)))
(contrib (make-named-cell cname)))
(p:switch c (pattern-value ?num) contrib)
(p:add-new! contrib)))
(accept (the-prop
`(accumulator ?type ?subject ?requester ,accumulation))
(list 'accumulator-result)
(list r)))))
Figure 6-9: Accumulation of values is only done when there is a need to do such accu-
mulation ((please-accumulate ?type ?subject ?requester) is accepted). When
there is such a need, only accepted numeric contributions of the form (contribution
?type ?subject ?num ?reason) matching the request for accumulation are used.
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(rule ((req
(accepted
(a-prop
'(please-determine-if ?subject is-insurable-by ?company)))))
(accept (the-prop '(please-accumulate risk ?subject ?company))
(list 'risk-evaluation)
(list req))
(rule ((result
(accepted
(a-prop
'(accumulator risk ?subject ?company ?risk-accumulator))))
(ath
(accepted
(a-prop
'(risk-accept-threshold ?company ?accept-threshold))))
(rth
(accepted
(a-prop
'(risk-reject-threshold ?company ?reject-threshold)))))
(let ((accumulated-risk-cell (pattern-value ?risk-accumulator))
(accept-threshold (pattern-value ?accept-threshold))
(reject-threshold (pattern-value ?reject-threshold)))
(p:> accept-threshold accumulated-risk-cell
(accepted (the-prop
'(?subject insurance-issued-by ?company))))
(p:> accumulated-risk-cell reject-threshold
(rejected (the-prop
'(?subject insurance-issued-by ?company))))
(p:and (e:<= accept-threshold accumulated-risk-cell)
(e:<= accumulated-risk-cell reject-threshold)
(accepted
(the-prop
'(?company needs-more-information ?subject)))))))
Figure 6-10: Only when there is a need to determine whether a potential cus-
tomer is insurable will the accumulation of risk be undertaken. More informa-
tion is needed to determine Danny’s insurability (accepted (the-prop '(?company
needs-more-information ?subject))) if the risk is between the accept and reject
thresholds.
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(true! '(please-determine-if Danny is-insurable-by AINTNO) 'ian). The
above rules and propagator mechanisms will then work to solve the problem of whether
or not Danny is insurable.
Based on this need to determine insurability, the code in Figure 6-10 establishes
a need to accumulate risk. At this point, only the simple rule expressions like those
in Figure 6-3 will be active to establish contributions to risk based on Danny’s en-
gagement in risky hobbies as according to the beliefs established in Figure 6-2.
On their own, these facts are enough to deny Danny insurance as he engages in
skydiving and motorcycling, does not engage in SCUBA diving, and nothing is known
about whether or not Danny is a rock climber. This belief may be demonstrated read-
ily, as the rejected state of (Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO) is held as true.
We may inquire as to why this is the case using the explain function (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 1), the re-
sults of which are given in Figure 6-11. At this description level (0), we find that
the rejection of (danny insurance-issued-by aintno) is supported (has-value
#t) based on the fact that the accumulated value in (out) (5.15) is greater than
the rejection threshold (3). The justification also explains that this accumulated
risk value is supported by the premises gathered from facebook, flickr, danny,
and risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4. This last premise is the
assumption that there are no more contributions to Danny’s risk.
We can, of course, ask for more detail by digging into a more detailed justification
level (2), which gives the answer in Figure 6-12. This justification demonstrates that
contributions to the risk came from the addition of the risks from rock-climbing,
scuba-diving, motorcycling, and sky-diving.
But what if Sally remembers that Facebook posts should not be used to support
rejections of insurability? In that case, we need only kick out the premises supported
by Facebook (retract! 'Facebook), which will drop the accumulated risk within
the bounds of issuance (risk < 2) and rejection (risk > 3) of insurance. In this
range, the system now accepts the need to look for more information to determine
Danny’s insurability (?company needs-more-information ?subject). As a result
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((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value
#t
by
((>:p) (out) (3))
with-premises
facebook
flickr
danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((out) has-value
5.15
by
((p:accumulator) (0))
with-premises
facebook
flickr
danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4))
Figure 6-11: A simple justification, generated by the function call (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 1)
of accepting this proposition, the system now may accept the need to prove whether
or not Danny eats unhealthy food (Figure 6-5) and will attempt to find proof of that
proposition (Figure 6-4).
With such rules on unhealthy food now active, the system is again able to reject
Danny’s insurance application, based on the fact that he eats unhealthy food (specif-
ically, he works at hals-hotdogs, a restaurant, implying that he eats their food,
hotdogs, which, according to the FDA, are unhealthy). This justification can, of
course, be obtained using the explain function at a suitably deep justification level
(2), as in Figure 6-13.
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((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value #t
by ((>:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno) (3))
with-premises facebook flickr danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno)
has-value 5.15
by (((accumulator (p:+)))
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero))
with-premises facebook flickr danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
has-value .25
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
(.25))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (rockclimbing)))
((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing))))
with-premises danny)
(((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
(-.1))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (scubadiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving))))
with-premises danny)
(((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
has-value 2.
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
(2.))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (motorcycling)))
((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling))))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises flickr)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
has-value 3.
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny 3. skydiver)))
(3.))
with-premises facebook)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 3. skydiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (skydiving)))
((accepted (danny engages-in skydiving))))
with-premises facebook)
(((accepted (danny engages-in skydiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero) has-value 0))
Figure 6-12: Danny’s hobbies may be used as a basis to reject his insurance, a fact
which comes out of the justification generated by the explain function, given here
and in Appendix A.
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((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value #t
by ((>:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno) (3))
with-premises nothing:1 flickr danny fda common-knowledge hal
parachutingassociation
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise6)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno)
has-value 4.050000000000001
by (((accumulator (p:+)))
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:6)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:5)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero))
with-premises
(hypothetical 460 nothing:1 in #[entity 461] bool)
flickr danny fda common-knowledge hal parachutingassociation
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise6)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:6)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 skydiver)))
(-.1))
with-premises parachutingassociation)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 skydiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (skydiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in skydiving))))
with-premises parachutingassociation)
(((rejected (danny engages-in skydiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises parachutingassociation)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:5)
has-value 2
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny 2 eats-unhealthy-food)))
(2))
with-premises fda common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2 eats-unhealthy-food)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (unhealthy-food)))
((accepted (danny eats unhealthy-food))))
with-premises fda common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (danny eats unhealthy-food)))
has-value #t
by ((((common-sense) (food)))
((& ((accepted (danny eats hotdogs)))
((accepted (hotdogs is unhealthy))))))
with-premises fda common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (hotdogs is unhealthy)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises fda)
(((accepted (danny eats hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by ((((eating-at) (restaurant)))
((& ((accepted (danny eats-at hals-hotdogs)))
((accepted (hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant)))
((accepted (hals-hotdogs primarily-serves hotdogs)))
((accepted (hotdogs is-a food))))))
with-premises common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (hotdogs is-a food)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises common-knowledge)
(((accepted (hals-hotdogs primarily-serves hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises hal)
(((accepted (danny eats-at hals-hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by ((((works-at) (restaurant)))
((& ((accepted (danny works-at hals-hotdogs)))
((accepted (hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant))))))
with-premises hal danny)
(((accepted (hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises hal)
(((accepted (danny works-at hals-hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
has-value .25
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
(.25))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (rockclimbing)))
((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing))))
with-premises danny)
(((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
(-.1))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (scubadiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving))))
with-premises danny)
(((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
has-value 2.
by ((switch:p)
((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
(2.))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (motorcycling)))
((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling))))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises flickr)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
has #(*the-nothing*))
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero) has-value 0))
Figure 6-13: Danny’s employment at Hal’s Hot Dogs may be used against him if
Aintno is unable to prove that he should be insured or not, a fact visible when using
the explain function. This text is also provided in Appendix A.
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Chapter 7
Beyond Propositions
Though I have demonstrated the viability of propositions in constructing and inte-
grating control with knowledge in problem solvers, it is difficult to prove that such
propositional reasoning is viable for all kinds of problem solving strategies. Certainly
the computational power of the underlying propagator network is equivalent to that of
a universal Turing machine1, but the mere ability to emulate any Turing machine does
not necessarily mean that propositional approaches are appropriate to all problems.
The true feasibility and flexibility of propositional problem solving can only be
uncovered in the course of future work spent exploring and implementing problem
solvers, using the propositional model, to solve different kinds of problems. Such work
will presumably uncover any weaknesses or flaws in the current system, whether such
flaws are due to current implementations of propagator networks or a fundamental
incompatibility of propositional problem solving with certain kinds of problems. In
the process of developing this propositional problem solving system, however, I have
identified a number of directions for future work to better determine the flaws of and
improve propositional problem solving. I will discuss these directions in detail in the
remainder of this chapter.
1Consider a single cell representing the state of the tape of a Turing machine, with propagators
attached to it which read the state stored in the cell and update it appropriately.
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7.1 Supporting Multiple Worldviews
A crucial assumption made in the implementation of propositions described in this
thesis is the assumption that each proposition is associated with one set of the five
belief states. That is, it is assumed that a belief state for a proposition will only ever
be believed or disbelieved; there is to be no superposition of belief.
Within the context of the “agency” of a single problem solving process, this is not
necessarily a problem. In the examples provided in previous chapters, the inability to
superpose belief and disbelief is a non-issue, because the goal of each (partial) problem
solver was to resolve discordant beliefs so as to draw an appropriate conclusion.
A problem arises when there is a need to reconcile or work with multiple beliefs
simultaneously, such as when the beliefs of two distinct agents must be coordinated.
In such a situation it is unclear how two agents’ beliefs should be kept separate.
Because each cell contains a simple TMS which contains a single supported truth
value, it is impossible to interpret a single accepted cell’s value in the light of both
agents simultaneously. Certainly, one could maintain separate sets of premises and
evaluate the single cell in light of each premise set to obtain the different truth values
associated with beliefs of the same proposition, but such a system hardly allows us
to connect or synthesize the two beliefs in any meaningful fashion. Premise sets are
“external” to the propagator network. The contents of cells in a propagator network
may only be evaluated with respect to one premise set at a time, so there is no way
to properly depend on two (potentially conflicting) premise sets.
There are several possibilities for addressing this need to represent what amounts
to two distinct “world views.” We could choose to create additional belief states asso-
ciated with a proposition, each representing an agent and its associated basic belief
(e.g. “john accepts”, “john rejects”, “jane accepts”, “jane rejects”). Such a mechanism
would allow for a meaningful grouping of all beliefs relating to a single proposition
within multiple world views. It may, however, complicate addressing and naming of
individual belief states associated with a world view when resolution of each cell name
requires knowledge of the agent who holds that state.
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Alternatively, we could represent each agent’s view of the proposition as a dis-
tinct proposition. This semantic reification of the proposition (e.g. (jane holds
(jack parent ben))) complicates instead the naming of a proposition, leaving the
problem of addressing the proposition, itself, unsolved. One benefit of this approach
is that rules may be easily constructed to relate two different agents’ views (e.g.
believes(jane, X) → believes(john, X)). That said, it is not immediately obvious
which approach is better, given that both approaches construct five additional belief
state cells for each agent which holds beliefs relating to a single proposition. As a re-
sult, regardless of the approach chosen to representing beliefs in multiple world views
with respect to a single proposition, the number of cells for both approaches scales
linearly in terms of the number of agents, and both are unwieldy in their naming
mechanisms.
An ideal solution would be to surface the underlying premise sets as cells on their
own and have propagators which make use of the premise-containing cells in any com-
putation (e.g. by propagating a value from an accepted belief state of one proposition
to another). Such a system has the advantage that each proposition retains only five
belief state cells, but comes with a distinct disadvantage: as propagators necessar-
ily do computation based on the contents of a cell, care must be taken to always
compute with respect to at least one set of premises. If this is not done, beliefs may
propagate to belief states in other propositions even though the relationships between
propositions themselves may differ between the worldviews.
For example, Jane and John may both accept the proposition (jack parent
ben), but they may instead disagree on the implication that such an acceptance nec-
essarily means that one must accept (jack ancestor jim). If this is done blindly
without consideration of a premise set, one may find that both Jane and John ac-
cept the latter proposition, even though they may not both accept the justification
generated to get there. Furthermore, as backtracking is currently handled when merg-
ing the contents of a cell with the contents of an update message, merge operations
would need to be able to directly manipulate the contents of relevant premise-cells,
complicating the design of the merge operations used in a propagator network.
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7.2 Proof by Contradiction
A practical example of the need for multiple world-views can be observed in the
principle of reductio ad absurdum, mentioned previously in this thesis. Unlike the
modus ponens strategy applied to generate the rule framework described in the previ-
ous chapters, proofs by contradiction cannot actually be implemented using a simple
propagator network in which each cell contains the reasons for supporting a particular
belief state. Effective application of proving a contradiction requires the creation of
a separate worldview in which the a belief contrary to what is to be proven is held
true. If we seek to prove that (jack parent ben) is to be accepted, we must create
a worldview which is identical to the current one except that (jack parent ben) is
rejected, and we must determine whether such rejection implies a contradiction.
Proving a belief by contradiction not only depends on the ability to represent two
worldviews (the original worldview in which we wish to assert the proven belief, as
well as the hypothetical worldview in which we attempt to show a contradiction),
which is difficult for reasons discussed above, but it also depends on the ability to
connect the worldviews. That is, the existence of a contradiction in the “contrary”
worldview in which (jack parent ben) is rejected necessarily creates an effect in
the original worldview by supporting the belief that we wished to prove in the first
place, (jack parent ben).
While such a system might indeed be made possible through the extension of
propagator networks to permit multiple worldviews, reductio ad absurdum is not
a method of argumentation that is currently feasible with the existing propagator
network infrastructure. It thus suggests that there is room for improvement of the
underlying propagator network substrate.
7.3 Alternate Belief States
Although I have laid out five belief states for each proposition in this thesis, it is
possible that more belief states may be useful or necessary for other computations.
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A number of modal qualifications exist for each proposition which may be better
served as a belief state, including the want-to-know modality expressed in the Aintno
example throughout the thesis.
Other modalities may also prove useful, including a modality of indifference (if
a problem solver need not factor in or care about the belief in a proposition) and a
modality of irrelevance (e.g. if a problem solver wishes to prove that some proposition
is true or false regardless of the belief in another proposition). It is unclear if these
modalities represent true alternate belief states in addition to the states of acceptance,
rejection, contradiction, knowledge, and ignorance. The want-to-know modality in
particular appears to be a proposition of its own, based on the fact that we may
consider a need-to-know itself to be accepted, rejected, or something of which we are
ignorant.
On a more fundamental level, however, the boundary between a true belief and
a modality deserving of its own proposition is unclear, as any belief may plausibly
be reified. For example, we might talk about the rejected belief of a proposition
(accepted (jack parent ben)), itself describing a belief in the acceptance of (jack
parent ben).
Regardless of the viability of various modalities of a proposition, however, the
set of five beliefs proposed here should be viewed as a minimal set, rather than a
complete set of the beliefs that apply to a given proposition. Additional use cases
of propositional problem solving may indeed find that one or more additional belief
states are necessary to solve other kinds of problems not detailed in this thesis.
7.4 Probability in Cells
Throughout this thesis, we have discussed beliefs such as acceptance or rejection as
if they have firm Boolean values associated with them (i.e. it is either 100% true
that we accept a proposition, 100% false, or, of course, 100% null). However, this
should not be seen as a judgment made with regard to probabilistic approaches to
reasoning and problem solving. Indeed, it is possible to imagine that, rather than
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storing a strict Boolean value in a TMS that a probability value is stored instead.
These probabilities could then be used in turn to support other propositions on the
basis of various probabilistic models and theories such as Bayesian inference.
In order to implement such a system, work must be done to establish a sound data
structure to replace the basic TMS and to develop appropriate propagators so as to
permit probabilistic calculations. For example, it may be the case that a probabilistic
model of belief should connect acceptance and rejection in such a way that a belief
that there is to be no contradiction necessarily forces the probability of acceptance to
be 1 minus the probability of rejection. Similarly, the data structure stored in cells
must be capable of handling probabilities appropriately, although it is possible that
a TMS may be sufficient.
7.5 Contributions and Conclusions
Despite these two flaws, the concept of propositional reasoning is compelling. By mod-
eling beliefs separately from the structure of the problem solver itself, it is possible to
inject complex control into problem solving and to make use of widely different mech-
anisms for doing so. For example, simply using knowledge of a solution’s existence
may make it possible to control the nature of and limit the extent of problem solving.
This is demonstrated most effectively in the scenario presented in the previous chap-
ter, in which work was not done to prove whether or not Danny ate unhealthy food
unless it was impossible to approve or deny Danny’s insurance by any other means.
Such a mechanism permits problem solvers to intelligently select goals. It also
provides flexibility in problem solving (there are no constraints in how or in what order
Danny’s risk must be scored) while still allowing for a level of control to effectively
account for hidden costs incurred in the process of problem solving (e.g. by restricting
the amount of work spent on Danny’s eating habits until the benefits outweighed the
costs of the work).
The nature of the underlying propagator network substrate of this system affords
other valuable benefits, including complex justification generation based on the struc-
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ture through which information and beliefs flow. By grounding such justifications in a
semantic-rich programming substrate, justifications are obtained at little cost and the
semantics of the propagator network can be used to obtain meaningful justifications
at multiple levels of detail.
Although work is clearly still needed to establish the practical viability of propo-
sitional techniques in problem solving as a whole, including work on the problems
of supporting multiple worldviews and adding support for proof by contradiction to
the underlying propagator architecture, propositional reasoning appears to be a func-
tional approach to general-purpose problem solving solutions which may better model
the flexibility of human thought for use in a dynamic, ever-changing world.
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Appendix A
A Sample Session with Propositional
Reasoning
The example scenario given in Chapter 6 provided only a handful of examples of
how Danny’s insurance might be determined. In practice, users may interact with
the propositional system through the standard read-eval-print loop of MIT/Scheme.
This appendix contains an extended interactive session and demonstrates explanation
generation in the Aintno scenario. Input is given on its own line, while expected
output is given within multi-line Scheme comments (beginning with #| and ending
with |#).
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;;; Ground facts about Danny
(true! '(Danny engages-in skydiving) 'Facebook)
(true! '(Danny engages-in motorcycling) 'Flickr)
(false! '(Danny engages-in scubadiving) 'Danny)
(unknown! '(Danny engages-in rockclimbing) 'Danny)
;;; His eating habits
(true! '(hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant) 'Hal)
(true! '(hals-hotdogs primarily-serves hotdogs) 'Hal)
(true! '(hotdogs is-a food) 'common-knowledge)
(true! '(hotdogs is unhealthy) 'FDA)
(true! '(Danny works-at hals-hotdogs) 'Danny)
(true! '(Danny likes hals-hotdogs) 'Danny)
;;; Ground facts about AINTNO
(true! '(risk-accept-threshold AINTNO 2) 'aintno-1)
(true! '(risk-reject-threshold AINTNO 3) 'aintno-2)
(length (db-alist-alist (content *database*)))
;Value: 19
;;; The problem
(true! '(please-determine-if Danny is-insurable-by AINTNO) 'gjs-1)
(length (db-alist-alist (content *database*)))
;Value: 24
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(cpp (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 1))
#|
((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value
#t
by
((>:p) (out) (3))
with-premises
facebook
flickr
danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((out) has-value
5.15
by
((p:accumulator) (0))
with-premises
facebook
flickr
danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4))
|#
(cpp (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 2))
#|
((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value #t
by ((>:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno) (3))
with-premises facebook flickr danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno)
has-value 5.15
by (((accumulator (p:+)))
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero))
with-premises facebook flickr danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
has-value .25
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber))) (.25))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (rockclimbing)))
((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing))))
with-premises danny)
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(((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver))) (-.1))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (scubadiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving))))
with-premises danny)
(((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
has-value 2.
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler))) (2.))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (motorcycling)))
((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling))))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises flickr)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
has-value 3.
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny 3. skydiver))) (3.))
with-premises facebook)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 3. skydiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (skydiving)))
((accepted (danny engages-in skydiving))))
with-premises facebook)
(((accepted (danny engages-in skydiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero) has-value 0))
|#
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(cpp (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 3))
#|
((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value #t
by ((>:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno) (3))
with-premises facebook flickr danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno)
has-value 5.15
by ((switch:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:construction:4)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:4))
with-premises facebook flickr danny
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:construction:4)
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise4)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:4)
has-value 5.15
by ((+:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:3)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:4))
with-premises danny flickr facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:3)
has-value 4.9
by ((+:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:2)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:3))
with-premises danny flickr facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:2)
has-value 5.
by ((+:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:1)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:2))
with-premises flickr facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:partial-sum:1)
has-value 3.
by ((+:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:1))
with-premises facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:1)
has-value 3.
by ((p:default-value)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1))
with-premises facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
has-value 3.
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny 3. skydiver))) (3.))
with-premises facebook)
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(((accepted (contribution risk danny 3. skydiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (skydiving)))
((accepted (danny engages-in skydiving))))
with-premises facebook)
(((accepted (danny engages-in skydiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises facebook)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:2)
has-value 2.
by ((p:default-value)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2))
with-premises flickr)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
has-value 2.
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler))) (2.))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (motorcycling)))
((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling))))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises flickr)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:3)
has-value -.1
by ((p:default-value)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3))
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver))) (-.1))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (scubadiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving))))
with-premises danny)
(((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:buffer:4)
has-value .25
by ((p:default-value) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4))
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero) has-value 0)
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((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
has-value .25
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber))) (.25))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (rockclimbing)))
((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing))))
with-premises danny)
(((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny))
|#
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(retract! 'Facebook)
(length (db-alist-alist (content *database*)))
;Value: 32
;;; We have other knowledge!
(false! '(Danny engages-in skydiving) 'ParachutingAssociation)
(length (db-alist-alist (content *database*)))
;Value: 33
;;; But Danny is still rejected, because of his eating habits.
(cpp (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 1))
#|
((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value #t
by ((>:p) (accumulation) (3))
with-premises nothing:1
flickr
danny
fda
common-knowledge
hal
parachutingassociation
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise6)
((accumulation)
has-value 4.050000000000001
by ((p:accumulator) (0))
with-premises nothing:1
flickr
danny
fda
common-knowledge
hal
parachutingassociation
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise6))
|#
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(cpp (explain
(rejected (proposition '(Danny insurance-issued-by AINTNO))) 2))
#|
((((rejected (danny insurance-issued-by aintno)))
has-value #t
by ((>:p) (risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno) (3))
with-premises nothing:1 flickr danny fda common-knowledge hal
parachutingassociation
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise6)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno)
has-value 4.050000000000001
by (((accumulator (p:+)))
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:6)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:5)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1)
(risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero))
with-premises
(hypothetical 460 nothing:1 in #[entity 461] bool)
flickr danny fda common-knowledge hal parachutingassociation
risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:premise6)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:6)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 skydiver))) (-.1))
with-premises parachutingassociation)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 skydiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (skydiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in skydiving))))
with-premises parachutingassociation)
(((rejected (danny engages-in skydiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises parachutingassociation)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:5)
has-value 2
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny 2 eats-unhealthy-food)))
(2))
with-premises fda common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2 eats-unhealthy-food)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (unhealthy-food)))
((accepted (danny eats unhealthy-food))))
with-premises fda common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (danny eats unhealthy-food)))
has-value #t
by ((((common-sense) (food)))
((& ((accepted (danny eats hotdogs)))
((accepted (hotdogs is unhealthy))))))
with-premises fda common-knowledge hal danny)
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(((accepted (hotdogs is unhealthy)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises fda)
(((accepted (danny eats hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by ((((eating-at) (restaurant)))
((& ((accepted (danny eats-at hals-hotdogs)))
((accepted (hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant)))
((accepted (hals-hotdogs primarily-serves hotdogs)))
((accepted (hotdogs is-a food))))))
with-premises common-knowledge hal danny)
(((accepted (hotdogs is-a food)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises common-knowledge)
(((accepted (hals-hotdogs primarily-serves hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises hal)
(((accepted (danny eats-at hals-hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by ((((works-at) (restaurant)))
((& ((accepted (danny works-at hals-hotdogs)))
((accepted (hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant))))))
with-premises hal danny)
(((accepted (hals-hotdogs is-a restaurant)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises hal)
(((accepted (danny works-at hals-hotdogs)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:4)
has-value .25
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber))) (.25))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny .25 rockclimber)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (rockclimbing)))
((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing))))
with-premises danny)
(((unknown (danny engages-in rockclimbing)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
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((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:3)
has-value -.1
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver))) (-.1))
with-premises danny)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny -.1 scubadiver)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (scubadiving)))
((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving))))
with-premises danny)
(((rejected (danny engages-in scubadiving)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises danny)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:2)
has-value 2.
by ((switch:p) ((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler))) (2.))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (contribution risk danny 2. motorcycler)))
has-value #t
by ((((risk-estimate) (motorcycling)))
((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling))))
with-premises flickr)
(((accepted (danny engages-in motorcycling)))
has-value #t
by (user)
with-premises flickr)
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:contribution:1) has #(*the-nothing*))
((risk:accumulator-of:danny:for:aintno:zero) has-value 0))
|#
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